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Abstract
THE BREAD AND THE CROSS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE EGYPTIAN LABOR MARKET
Ahmed Ezz Eldin Mohamed
M.A. of Public Policy Thesis, 2014
Abdurrahman Aydemir, Supervisor
Key Words: Religious discrimination, labor market, Egypt, wage discrimination, minority 
rights
Do Christians face discrimination in the Egyptian labor market? In the last few years, 
religious discrimination in the Egyptian labor market has been an ongoing debate between 
the Egyptian government, Christian activists, and international observers. Yet, no systemic 
empirical study of the issue was provided to enrich the debate with concrete objective 
evidence. As a result, this paper aims at filling this gap by empirically examining religious 
discrimination in wages, receipt of non-pecuniary benefits, working conditions, and access 
to different tracks of employment. Using recent data from the Egyptian Labor Market Panel 
Survey (ELMPS 2012), this study employs a set of econometric techniques including OLS 
regression analysis, propensity score matching, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, and probit 
models to determine the forms and extent of religious discrimination in the labor market. 
Our findings suggest that Christians do not face discrimination in wages, receipt of job’s 
non-pecuniary benefits, and working conditions. However, Christians have a disadvantage 
in access to wage employment in general, and government employment in particular, 
proposing religious discrimination as a possible explanation. These results enlighten the 
debate by defining the areas where discrimination is taking place and policies are needed. 
vÖzet
EKMEK VE HAÇ: MISIR İŞ GÜCÜ PİYASASINDAKİ DİN TEMELLİ 
AYRIMCILIĞININ AMPİRİK ANALİZİ
Ahmed Ezz Eldin Mohamed
M.A. of Public Policy Thesis, 2014
Abdurrahman Aydemir, Supervisor
Anahtar Kelimeler: Din ayrımcılığı, işçi piyasası, Mısır, Maaş ayrımcılığı, azınlık hakları
Mısır işgücü piyasasındaki Hristiyanlar ayrımcılığa maruz kalıyor mu? Son bir kaç yılda,iş 
gücü piyasasındaki  din temelli ayrımcılık; hükümetler, Hristiyan aktivistler ve uluslararası 
gözlemciler tarafından tartışma konusu haline gelmiştir. Fakat, bugüne kadar tartışmayı 
geliştirecek, konuyla ilgili tarafsız kanıtlar sunacak ampirik bir çalışma henüz 
yapılmamıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışmada biz maaşlar, ayni haklar, çalışma koşulları ve 
farklı iş kollarına erişim bağlamında bu konuyu ampirik olarak inceledik. Mısır İşgücü 
piyasası anketini kullanarak farklı ekonometrik tekniklerle incelemelerde bulunduk. En 
küçük karelere metodu, propensity score eşleme, Oaxaca – Blinder ayrıştırma ve logit 
metodlarını kullanarak ayrımcılığın boyutlarını ve kapsamını ortaya çıkarmaya çalıştık. 
Sonuçlarımız gösterdi ki, Hristiyanlar; maaş, ayni haklar ve çalışma koşulları bağlamında 
herhangi bir ayrımcılıkla karşı karşıya kalmıyorlar. Fakat Hristiyanların, maaşlı işler 
bulmakta, özellikle devlet memurluğu bağlamında dezvantajlı olduğunu gösterdik. Bu 
sonuçlar, ayrımcılığın hangi bağlamda yer aldığı, tanımlanması ve konu ile ilgili politika 
önerileri oluşturulması için ayrımcılık tartışmasına ampirik katkı sunmaktadır.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In 640 A.D., the Arab Muslim army conquered Egypt, a vital center of Christianity in the ancient 
world. Centuries of cooperation, conflict, tolerance, violence, revolutions, pacts, external threats, 
internal divisions, common struggle, messianic visions, holy wars, barbaric clashes, and educated 
debates shaped the history of the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Egypt. Through 
a long slow process, the Christian country turned to be the most populous Muslim country in the 
Middle East. In the midst of the rising tides of globalization and human rights movements, 
questioning the nature of the relationship between Muslims and Christians became a valid 
proposition. 
In the last few years, the Christian minority has been facing increasing assaults and restrictions 
on their freedoms. This has increased the pace and intensity of religious activism inside Egypt by 
the frustrated Christian youth. Along the same lines, the global community has condemned the 
rising incidents of religious discrimination, calling for actions. On the other hand, the successive 
Egyptian governments and many domestic players, including some Christians, undermined the 
claims for religious discrimination. In many instances, Christian activism against discrimination 
was considered an act of harming the Egyptian national reputation and the international 
statements on the issue were looked upon as undesirable foreign intervention in domestic national 
affairs. Accordingly, the debate on religious discrimination remained active, but stagnant in its 
implications.
Labor market is one of the fields where religious discrimination was repeatedly reported. Access 
to labor market and returns from labor activities are core sources for individuals’ welfare. Also, 
the economic empowerment of the minority and providing them with equal opportunities would 
enhance their political participation and sense of belonging. Consequently, discrimination in the 
labor market could have serious implications. Yet, the claims of the existence of religious 
discrimination in the Egyptian labor market were not verified empirically. They also lack clear 
2identification of the forms and scale of religious discrimination, if it were to exist in the first 
place. As per our knowledge, no study has provided statistical empirical evidence to meet these 
needs. Accordingly, investigating the existence and understanding the mechanisms and the scale 
of religious discrimination in the labor market is essential for both domestic and international 
policy making. Domestically, better informed policy actors are more likely to suggest sound 
policies and focus on the important aspects. Internationally, identifying the significance of the 
labor market in the issue of religious discrimination will determine its weight on the talks’ agenda 
between the Egyptian government and the international community.
This study responds to these needs by providing pioneering empirical investigation of religious 
discrimination in the Egyptian labor market. Although analyzing discrimination in wages is our 
core contribution, we also examine the possibility of discrimination in the receipt of non-
pecuniary benefits, working conditions, labor force participation, employment, access to wage 
employment, and access to government employment. The used data are obtained from Egypt’s 
Labor Market Panel Survey 2012 (ELMPS 2012) prepared by the Economic Research Forum 
(ERF) in cooperation with Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS). Our main findings suggest no discrimination in wages, non-pecuniary benefits, 
working conditions, labor force participation, and employment. There is a possibility of 
discrimination in access to wage employment in general and the government sector in particular
as Christians are less likely to be employed as wage employees or as government workers.
However, these differences may also be driven by different preferences for these types of jobs.
The paper starts by surveying the relevant literature before providing a brief background on the 
issue of discrimination in Egypt. Then, we proceed with our empirical analysis of wages as the 
main subject. Afterwards, other possible forms of discrimination in the labor market are 
examined. We conclude by suggesting policy implications based on our findings. 
3Chapter 2 
Literature Review
2.1. Theories of Discrimination
The simplest definition of discrimination is “when equal productivity is not rewarded with equal 
pay” (Aigner and Cain, 1977; 177). This could be broadened to imply that discrimination is any 
differentiation in treatment between individuals belonging to different groups in wages, access to 
employment, work accommodations, promotions… etc, for factors unrelated to their productivity. 
To explain that phenomenon, the discrimination literature suggests two theoretical frameworks.  
Taste-based theories assume that discrimination takes place due to different preferences by 
various economic agents in the market (Becker, 1957). As economic agents experience disutility 
from dealing with certain groups in the market, they are willing to pay in order to avoid dealing 
with the less preferred groups. The classical example of taste-based discrimination is the white 
employers’ discrimination against black workers in the United States. According to Becker 
(1957), in a competitive market, if employers have different tastes for discrimination, 
discrimination will cease to exist in the long run. However, if employers have the same prejudice 
against minority workers, discrimination will persist in the market. In case of discrimination 
against the minority by co-workers or customers, segregation will be the most likely outcome. 
For competitive markets, the theory suggests that discrimination is not profitable, and so it is less 
likely to persist in the long run.  However, in markets with imperfect competition, discrimination 
could become worse and more prevalent. Stiglitz (1973) pointed out that, under monopolies and 
oligopolies, if the ownership claims are not evenly distributed among different societal groups, 
their incomes will differ as a result of the variation in their shares of the monopoly rents. For 
government monopolies, Alchian and Kessel (1962) highlighted that discrimination could be 
practiced and sustained at no loss in profits as they are not constrained by maximizing profits. 
Also, labor unions could be monopolized by the majority and exclude the minority which sustains 
4the latter’s disadvantages in the labor market by limiting their bargaining power (Stiglitz, 1973; 
Cain, 1986). 
In contrast to assuming the majority’s preferences as the reason for discrimination, statistical 
discrimination theories propose that decision makers use observable characteristics of individuals 
as an indicator of their unobserved outcome-relevant characteristics (Fang and Moro,  2011). On 
one hand, Phelps (1972) argues that the source of inequality between groups is some unexplained 
exogenous differences between the different groups of workers which are met with imperfect 
information about worker’s productivity from the employer’s side. On the other hand, Arrow 
(1973) claim that average group differences in the aggregate level are endogenously driven in the 
equilibrium. He assumes no exogenous variations between groups. Decision makers hold 
asymmetric views about members from different groups which are derived in equilibrium, i.e. 
“Self-fulfilling stereotypes”. In both cases, employers use group characteristics as a proxy for 
individual’s productivity without having a specific taste for a certain group.1     
Both theoretical frameworks focus on explaining the existence and persistence of discrimination 
in the labor market. However, they pay less attention to the composition of discrimination. It is 
usually implied that discrimination takes place on one ground, i.e. race, gender, or class. A more 
recent body of literature challenged this notion suggesting the complex composition of 
discrimination. Some economists highlighted the importance of the class-race-gender nexus in 
explaining the complexities of discrimination in the labor market (Williams, 1987; Darity and 
Mason, 1998; Brewer, Conrad, and King, 2002). Makonnen (2002) has differentiated between 
three types of discrimination. First, multiple discrimination takes place on one ground at a time, 
but is accumulated over time. Second, compound discrimination occurs when discrimination on 
the bases of two or more grounds adds to each other. Third, intersectional discrimination operates 
when discriminatory practices on different grounds happen and interact with each other 
                                                          
1 An alternative, or rather complementary, explanation to the phenomena of group differentials in the labor market, 
suggested by Goldberg (1982), is that nepotism in favor of the majority could also generate variations in labor 
market outcomes.1 In fact, Goldberg finds that a long-run wage advantage in favor of whites is sustained under 
competitive conditions. Despite the extent of the application of this view, it highlights the complexity of defining the 
determinants of group differences. The wage differential between two groups could arise as a result of both 
discrimination pushing the wages of the minority downwards and nepotism raising the majority’s wages. Cotton 
(1988) and Neumark (1988) have decomposed a method to decompose these two effects of overpayment and 
underpayment on creating the group differentials.
5concurrently. The core point made by those scholars is to pinpoint to the fact that the 
interpretation of the “unexplained” component of group variations could be hardly related to a 
single form of discrimination. 
In a nutshell, the theoretical literature on discrimination is rich and diverse. Taste-based and 
statistical discrimination theories complement, rather than substitute, each other. Given the 
convoluted composition of discrimination, any interpretation should be done under clear 
assumptions and with great caution.      
2.2. The Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on discrimination is vast and covering a wide set of topics. Scholars have 
studied discrimination on bases of gender, race, religion, class, appearance, age, and sexual
orientation in both developed and developing countries. Accordingly, there are several research 
outcomes to be highlighted from the applied literature. 
Firstly, discrimination in the labor market is almost a worldwide phenomenon with variant 
degrees across different countries and different regions within the same country. It is prevalent in 
both the developed (Yamane, 2011; Metcalf and Rolf, 2010; Foroutan, 2011; Riach and Rich, 
1992; Neumark et al., 1995; Khatab et al., 2011, Booth et al, 2012; Bursell, 2007; Duguet et al., 
2007; Bursell, 2007) and developing countries (Waran, 2006; Banerjee and Knight, 1985; Chen, 
2004; Wei, 2007; Chong and Nopo, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002; Morento et al., 2004; Lovell, 
1993; Desi and Singh, 1989; Kara, 2006; Ashraf and Ashraf, 1998). The level and type of 
discrimination based on a certain criteria is different from one country to another. For instance, 
Kara (2006) finds that gender discrimination in wages in Turkey is double its level in Pakistan 
(Ashraf and Ashraf, 1998). Within the same country, Lovell (1993) reported that while racial 
discrimination in earnings is almost inexistent in northern Brazil, it is evident in the southern part 
of the country. In the United States, Mayrl and Saperstein (2012) found that reported 
discrimination against evangelical Protestants is confined to the South, while discrimination due 
to political affiliation is more influential in other regions.
Secondly, in many societies, discrimination takes place on multiple grounds interacting with
each other. This leads to difficulties in separating the effects of different types of discrimination 
generating the unequal market outcomes (Yamane, 2011). In India, Waran (2006) finds that 
6females face wage discrimination in the labor market along with the existing discrimination based 
on the individual’s caste. Similarly, in Israel, Haberfeld and Cohen (2007) highlighted that 
females earn less than males regardless of their position on the socioeconomic hierarchy, i.e. 
whether upper Ashkenazim class, middle Mizrahim class, or lower Arab class .  Chen (2004) 
points out that gender discrimination is combined with age discrimination in China. For instance, 
employers in the manufacturing sector usually displace female workers above 35 years old. In 
Canada, Sorensen (1995) points out that female immigrants are more likely to face severer 
discrimination due to both their gender and foreign origin. 
Thirdly, the extent of discrimination differs by the type of occupation, sector, and firm’s 
characteristics. Banerjee and Knight (1985) show that, in India, discrimination is the highest in 
operative jobs and is relatively less in white-collar jobs. Along the same lines, Kara (2006) finds 
that Turkish women face less discrimination in occupations that are considered public like 
secretaries or doctors, more discrimination in occupations requiring physical strength, and 
positive discrimination in female-oriented jobs like nurses . Banerjee et al. (2008) found that 
discrimination in jobs requiring hard skills and certifications are less likely to happen than in jobs 
focusing on soft skills (26). For the sectoral differences, discrimination is found to be less in the 
public sector in both India and Turkey (Banerjee and Knight, 1985; Waran, 2006; Kara, 2006). In 
India, the private formal sector has more caste-based discrimination than the informal sector 
(Banerjee and Knight, 1985).2 These variations extend to the firm level. Carlsson and Rooth 
(2007) find the level of ethnic discrimination by Swedish firms differ by the number of the 
employees in the workplace, the degree of personnel turnover, and the size of immigrant 
population in the firm’s municipality. Their rationale behind the fact that larger firms are less 
likely to discriminate is that they have a more comprehensive and better recruitment process that 
reduces statistical discrimination (726).
Fourthly, the level of discrimination is responsive to changes in economic and political 
conditions. For instance, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) find that firms are more likely to
                                                          
2 The variation in the degree of discrimination in different sectors is related to the role of social networks (Banerjee 
and Knight, 1985). Networks are more likely to be employed in the informal private sector where there are no rules 
for hiring and it mostly depends on personal connections. Although this might lead to segregation in the labor 
market, it reduces the impact of discrimination in access to employment as a whole. This highlights the role of social 
networks in determining the market outcomes (Rees, 1966; Booman, 1975; Topa, 2001; Granovetter, 1995; Calvo-
Armangol and Jackson, 2004; Tassier and Manczer, 2005). 
7discriminate against some ethnic groups if availability of jobs is scarce. If this could be 
generalized, one could predict discrimination to increase in times of recession. In fact, Loureiro, 
Carneiro, and Sachsida (2004) highlighted that the intensity of discrimination in Brazil increased 
with consolidation of economic liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. In the United 
States, the events of September 2001 have increased the level of discrimination against Muslims 
(Grisham, 2006; Huang and Kleiner, 2001).3
Fifth, in some cases, statistical measures of discrimination could be in contradiction with people’s 
perceptions on discrimination in the labor market. In their survey of the literature on 
discrimination in Latin America, Chong and Nopo (2007) find that there is a perception of 
discrimination that coexist with lack of evidence on discriminatory practices. They relate this to 
either the failure of studies to capture some forms of discrimination, or that the public discourse 
based on historical experiences of discrimination, which are no more valid, shapes people’s 
perceptions (15). This observation is elucidated by others scholars who highlighted the problems 
with self-reporting discrimination due to its subjectivity (Beilby and Baron, 1987; Arrow, 1973; 
Matthews, 2006; Goto et al., 2002; Mendes and Candeias, 2013; Neto, 2006; Brub, 2008; Dailey 
et al., 2010, Mellor, 2004; Essed, 1991). 
Sixth, labor market segregation and discrimination are strongly related. Semyonov’s (1988) study 
on the Arab and Jewish communities in Israel provides a good example of that. If discrimination 
is prevalent in integrated societies against minorities, then minority groups would seek protection 
in their own segregated labor markets. This is evident in the contrast between the significant level 
of income and occupational discrimination faced by Arabs working in bi-ethnic labor market, and 
those working in mono-ethnic markets in Israel. The latter have strong occupational advantage 
(264). This provides a hint on the persistence of segregated labor markets in practice.       
These general points might not hold in every setting. Still, they provide insights about the 
phenomenon of discrimination in the labor market. The situation in the developing countries is 
not expected to be significantly different from their developed counterparts. For the previous 
points, examples were provided from both developing and developed countries. However, if there 
                                                          
3 Aslund and Rooth (2005) investigated the impact of 9/11 events on the shifting the attitudes towards Muslims and 
so the discrimination in the Swedish labor market against them. They couldn’t find evidence of increasing 
discrimination. Their explanation is that discrimination is not based on preferences that changes quickly. However, 
these different findings underscore the importance of case by case analysis.  
8is one point to be emphasized regarding developing countries, it is the significant role of “pre-
market” discrimination which might attribute most of the disparities between groups to factors 
related to productivity. In this case, the labor market discrimination rates might be misleading, as 
the roots of the problem lie somewhere else. This was observed in India (Waran, 2006), Brazil 
(Saboia and Saboia, 2009; Barros and Reis, 1991; Ramos and Vieria, 2001) and South Africa 
(Case and Deaton, 1991; Case and Yogo, 1999; Crounch, 1996; Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz, 
2000; Yamauchi, 2005; O’Gorman, 2010). It is to be noted that this property is not unique to 
developing countries, yet its impact is likely to be higher and more common due to their early 
stage of development.            
2.3. Religious Discrimination
Despite receiving less attention than other forms of discrimination, religious discrimination is 
well-documented in the literature. Several studies examined discrimination against Muslims in 
the labor market in the United States (Davila and Mora, 2005; Kaushal et al, 2006; Selim, 2007), 
Sweden (Aslund and Rooth, 2005; ), Australia(Foroutan, 2011), Austria and Germany 
(Forestenlencer and Al-waqfi, 2010), UK (Khatab et al, 2011; Heath and Martin, 2013), and 
France (Pierne, 2013). Besides Muslims, discrimination against Irish Catholics in Scotland 
(Walls and Williams, 2010), Catholics in Northern Ireland (Cradden, 1993; Dingley and Morgan, 
2005; Ewing, 2000), and Evangelicals in the US (Mayrl and Saperstein, 2012) was also subject to 
research efforts. For developing countries, the literature on religious discrimination is very 
limited. In China, Lu (2009) indicates the existence of religious discrimination against Falun 
Gong practitioners by removing them from their working places (39). Desi and Singh (1989) 
found evidence for discrimination in earnings for Sikh men vis-à-vis Hindu high caste men in 
India. Moreover, Morrison and Jutting (2005) conducted a study for developing countries to 
investigate the cross country variations in gender discrimination in the labor market by religion. 
They find that there is a tendency for higher gender inequalities in Muslim countries compared to 
Christian or Buddhist ones. Also, gender inequalities in labor market participation are higher in 
Muslim and Hindu countries than Christian and Buddhist ones (1072-1077). This study pinpoints 
9the need for caution in interpreting the source of discrimination against women in particular when 
dealing with different religious communities.4
Most of these studies underscore discrimination in certain practices in the labor market. However, 
one important observation is the relation between religious discrimination and appearance. Few 
researchers drew attention to the fact that discrimination could take place in the labor market 
based on physical appearance and dressing style, especially in the hiring stage (Corbett, 2007; 
Muhajan, 2007; Johnson and Higgens, 1987; Rigio and Throcmorton, 1988). The justification for 
this sort of discrimination is that appearance affects customer’s perceptions about the company 
and its products and services (Bello, 2004). It acts as a technique for marketing (Muhajan, 2007). 
Besides that, the appearance-based policies by a certain employer stem from the cultural and 
structural dimensions in the workplace (Green, 2005). So, even if discrimination is practiced on 
the bases of ethnicity or religion, it is usually severer for those members who are “visibly 
different” (Anker, 1998, 18). For example, Foroutan (2011) found that Muslim immigrants in 
Australia who have Middle Eastern and Northern African origins are more likely to face 
discrimination than Muslim immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa or the pacific Islands as the 
first’s religious identity is more visible through their names and dressing codes (333). So, the link 
between religion and appearance could provide an explanation of why religious discrimination 
takes place and why its impact could be severer for some groups like women. 
Although scholars of discrimination achieved significant progress in studying religious 
discrimination, there are two areas that need to be further enhanced. First, the investigation and 
analysis of religious discrimination in developing countries is very limited given their number, 
history, and diversity. In fact, as most of the developing countries face institutional challenges 
that hinders law enforcement and ruled by less democratic regimes that might suppress minority 
rights, the issue of religious discrimination could be of strong relevance and significant impact on 
people’s lives in those countries. Second, a big part of the existing literature is qualitative and 
subjective in nature. It depends on interviews and survey research which could lead to the 
problems of self-reported discrimination discussed earlier. So, more quantitative studies should 
                                                          
4 For instance, if a study managed to find discrimination against Muslim women living in a Christian country, the 
discrimination could be practiced by members of the minority’s religion due to certain religious beliefs, or the 
members of the majority’s religion. The latter would be religious discrimination, but the first is gender 
discrimination. This distinction is important for policy implications.  
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be employed to test for the external validity of the qualitative research findings. Accordingly, 
there is a need for more quantitative studies of religious discrimination in general, and for 
developing countries in particular.     
2.4. Discrimination in Egypt      
Compared to many countries, Egypt is relatively homogenous in terms of its ethnic and religious 
structure. Accordingly, most of the official data collected on the Egyptian population and labor 
force surveys overlooked the religious and ethnic characteristics of individuals. This has left 
researchers with the gender dimension as the core topic of the Egyptian literature on 
discrimination in the labor market. Although religious and gender discrimination are different in 
many aspects, understanding the operation of discriminatory practices in labor market through the 
lens of gender could provide useful insights for discrimination studies in Egypt in general.  
The existence of a level of gender discrimination in the labor market is a common conclusion in 
most, if not all, of the studies. Using 2006 labor survey data, El-Haddad (2009) estimated that 
female workers receive 37 percent lower wages due to discrimination. This is worse than the 24 
percent wage discrimination in 1998 (22).5 Kandil (2009) reports that discrimination, in absolute 
terms, has increased from 8% in 1988, to 10% in 1998, then declined to 8.6% in 2006.6 However, 
relative discrimination increased over time which conforms to El Haddad (2009) findings. In 
addition, Kandil (2009) shows that discrimination levels differ by wage quartile and level of 
education. Absolute discrimination increased along the wage distribution and was higher for the 
high educated females. This indicates a phenomena of “glass ceiling” in the market (24).   
Moreover, discrimination in not homogenous across different economic sectors, but its level 
differs by sector of employment. Said (2007) finds evidence for gender discrimination in the 
private and public enterprises, but not in the public sector for the years 1988, 1998, and 2006.7
Using different data set, Said (2011) discovered that discrimination is the highest in private 
enterprises, followed by government and then public enterprises. In her study of discrimination in 
                                                          
5 The difference from the previous study could be related to the data and techniques used. 
6 The absolute discrimination percentage indicates by how much higher is the observed male-female average wage 
ratio than what would prevail in non-discriminatory setting.
7 Interestingly, the wage differential and discrimination increased in the public enterprises over time which reflects 
their institutional shift to resemble the private sector (Said, 2007, 6).  
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tradable and non-tradable sectors, El Hamidi (2007) elaborated that contribution of 
discrimination to the gender wage gap has increased between 1998 and 2006 in tradable sectors, 
while decreasing in non-tradable sectors. In another variation of labor market sectors, Assad 
(1995) argued that the lower female wages in the unprotected sector of the economy is due to 
higher discrimination in that sector than the protected one. This discrimination could be even 
stronger in non-Metropolitan regions, which highlights the regional variation of discrimination 
levels.  
Besides discrimination, gender based labor segregation is also an existent phenomenon in the 
market and explains part of the gender wage differentials. Although occupational segregation 
worked in favor of females wages in the government sector, it accounts for about 50 and 35 
percent of the unjustified component in the gender gap in the public corporations and the private 
sector, respectively (Said, 2011). In a more specialized study, El Haddad (2011) examined 
employment in the Textile industry and identified “concealed discrimination” at the entry point 
where women are pushed towards low paying firms and occupations, although this is largely due 
to their limited endowments. The main point is that inter-occupational wage differences and 
segregation could create unjustified disparities among different labor groups.        
These findings on gender discrimination enable us to draw a picture for the phenomenon in the 
market. Simply stated, discrimination is far from uniformity as it varies across time, sector of 
employment, and even regions. This property should be taken into consideration while 
conducting any study on the subject, especially in the Egyptian context. Many forms of labor 
market discrimination are left untouched in the literature on Egypt including ethnic, religious, and 
even appearance based discrimination. Accordingly, this study makes use of the newly available 
data to explore an unvisited dimension of discrimination in the labor market; religious 
discrimination.  
12
Chapter 3
Religious Discrimination in Egypt
Legally, the Egyptian constitution guarantees freedom of belief and practice of religion for 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Islam is the state’s official religion and principles of Sharia law 
are the primary source of legislation. The state does not recognize non-Ibrahamic religions and 
unorthodox Islamic sects. Demographically, Sunni Muslims represent the great majority of 
population, about 90 percent, followed by the Christian minority which constitutes from 8 to 12 
percent of the population (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2012).8 Smaller 
minorities like Bahai’s, Jews, and Shiite Muslims represent insignificant percentage of the 
population. The majority of Christians belongs to the Coptic Orthodox Church. They have higher 
concentration in Upper Egypt and the large cities like Cairo and Alexandria. Along with the 
Copts, there are other Christian communities; the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, 
Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox churches. The Coptic Church has deep historical roots that go 
back to early centuries of Christianity. Its Pope in Alexandria is considered the main head of the 
Christian community in Egypt which gives his church a special official recognition. 
Despite the fact that Christians and Muslims coexisted in Egypt for long centuries, their 
relationship is far from uniformity. In the Twentieth century, one can distinguish between two 
eras of their relationship, with Sadat’s (1970-1981) presidency as the turning point. The classical 
image of the relationship presents Christians and Muslims as the “two elements of the Egyptian 
nation.”  It has its roots in the famous symbol of the cross and the crescent and the historical 
slogan of “long live the crescent and the cross” which were raised during the Egyptian uprising 
against the British occupation in 1919. Yet, with the rise of political Islam, Islamic 
fundamentalism, sectarian violence, and the growing complexities of the domestic political map 
during Sadat’s era, Christians felt  increasingly marginalized which pushed the Coptic Church 
into a face-off with the state. As the Egypt turned towards Western powers during Sadat’s era, 
Coptic immigrants’ activism placed the Christian dilemma on the international political agenda. 
                                                          
8 There are no accurate statistics of Christian population in Egypt.
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Although the alignment between the Church and the State was regained during Mubarak’s era, 
most of the challenges facing the Christian community in Egypt were never resolved and 
maintained their place on the political agenda between Egypt and the West. Thus, the 
internationalization of the Christian dilemma, the stagnation of state’s reactions, and the violent 
confrontations turned the definition of the relationship between Christians and Muslims from 
“two national elements” to a “majority and minority.”
Generally speaking, according to PEW Research, Egypt maintained high level of government 
restrictions on religion in 2011 and 2012. In terms of social hostility involving religion, it 
increased gradually from “high” in 2007 to “very high” in 2012. This indicates that the problem 
of discrimination is becoming more serious in recent years, especially after the Arab Spring.  
More specifically, Christian activists and international entities, concerned with religious 
discrimination, list various violations to religious freedom and equality that affects the Christian 
community. Christians also have lower political representation relative to their population, 
holding for example 10 seats in the 518 seat People's Assembly as of December 2010.    
Discrimination in the labor market against Christians is a frequent item on the list and  was 
mentioned by many observers. The International Religious Freedom Report 2012, issued by the 
American Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, pinpointed that the government 
discriminates against Christians in public sector hiring and staff appointments in public 
universities. There were no Christians serving as presidents, or deans in Egypt’s 17 public 
universities. Also, Christians are underrepresented in senior government positions, the police, the 
military, and the educational sector. In a hearing in the US Helsinki Commission, the issue of 
discrimination in the workplace was also ambiguously raised. Since 2007, the International Labor 
Organization has pointed out to the practice of religious discrimination in the labor market. These 
international notes on religious discrimination in the labor market find resonance among the 
Egyptian Christian activists and citizens. On the other hand, the Egyptian government denies 
these charges of religious discrimination in the labor market. For instance, after the ILO issued its 
statement on discrimination in Egypt in 2007, the Egyptian Minister of Labor Force and 
Immigration issued a statement in response to the ILO claims and argued that there is no religious 
discrimination against Christians in the labor market (Al Ahram, 2007). This denial was 
translated into governmental inaction towards the issue of discrimination in the labor market. 
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It is evident that the problem of discrimination against Christians in Egypt occupies an important 
position in both international and domestic debates. After the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the 
Christian activism against discrimination was best portrayed in the Maspero sit in that was 
crushed by the ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces in October 2011. The incident led to 
international condemnation. The rise of political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism added to the 
seriousness of the issue. Internationally and domestically, calls for ending religious 
discrimination were intensified. 
Given these circumstances, two crucial questions should be raised. First, how far do these 
tensions reflect on the labor market? If discrimination is widely practiced, there are no reasons to 
believe that labor market would be a neutral zone. The historical experiences of many countries 
teach us that labor market is an ideal area where discrimination could be exercised. Second, if 
discrimination is practiced in the labor market, what is its extent and forms? Despite demarking 
the labor market as a field for discrimination by national and international actors, there is 
vagueness in defining its forms and measuring its levels. This hinders basing the debate on solid 
empirical grounds and suggesting the relevant policies and measures. Accordingly, this paper 
aims at guiding one aspect of the discrimination debate on concrete empirical evidence.      
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Chapter 4
Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1. Data
This study employs the Egypt’s Labor Market Panel Survey of 2012 (ELPMS 2012), carried out 
by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with Egypt’s Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). The ELMPS is a nationally representative panel survey 
covering a wide set of topics. In its three previous versions, it did not contain information on the 
religion of the respondents. However, in ELMPS 2012, a recent question on the religion of the 
individuals was added in a section on marriage patterns. We exploit this question to track its 
respondents and draw the link between the religion of the participants and their labor market 
outcomes. Unfortunately, this question is applied only to all ever married individuals irrespective 
of sex and aged 18-39, which restricts our sample. Furthermore, for most of the study, we 
disregard those who are not in the labor force or unemployed which cuts our sample down by 
about half its size. Then, by focusing on wage earners, we would be left with a sample size of 
4583 observations. Although the total size of the sample is convenient, the size of the sample for 
Christian wage earners is only 233 observations. This hinders the breaking down of the data to 
compare gender or sectoral differences and produce general conclusions accordingly. In addition, 
in our analysis, we distinguish between three samples; all wage earners, regular wage earners, 
and full time regular wage earners. Table (4.1.1) shows the detailed numbers of observations for 
the whole sample and its sub-samples.9
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table (4.2.2) shows that the two groups have similar gender composition. In terms of regional 
concentration, more than 60 percent of Christians live in Upper Egypt, where about 45 percent of 
Muslims live in Lower Egypt. The illiteracy rate among Christians is higher, but also they have 
larger portion of their population as university graduates. Although the average years of 
                                                          
9 Weights are not considered for this table only, but are employed in the following tables. 
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schooling of both groups is the same, distribution of educational attainment is slightly more 
concentrated at the extremes for Christians. 
In terms of labor force participation and employment rates, there are no mentionable differences 
between the two groups. However, within those who are employed, we could observe some 
differences in table (4.2.3). Christians, compared to Muslims, are lenient towards being 
employers at the expense of working in the wage employment sector. This could imply two 
things. They could be facing discrimination in access to wage employment which pushes them 
towards establishing their own businesses. Also, in a Weberian sense, Christians could be 
enjoying a stronger entrepreneurial attitude which directs them towards establishing their own 
businesses rather than being stuck in the relatively rigid wage employment. Moreover, within the 
wage employment sector, Christians are more likely to join the private sector at the expense of 
the government sector. Given that the informal sector of the economy is private, they have 
slightly higher representation in the informal sector than Muslims. Similar to the previous 
explanation, this higher tendency to join the private sector could be a result of discrimination in 
access to government employment, or personal preferences. With regard to job stability, the two 
groups show strong resemblance. 
With respect to job benefits, table (4.2.4) pinpoints that Christian wage earners have a slight 
advantage in their hourly and monthly wages. For wage earners in the permanent and temporary 
jobs, Christians earn higher total quarterly wages. Furthermore, the quarterly wage is split into 
two components; basic and non-basic. The basic component is fixed, while the non-basic 
component could differ as it contains bonuses, incentives, profit share, supplementary wages, 
overtime and other payments. Both components are estimated for three months to sum up to the 
total quarterly wage. Christians enjoy higher basic wages, but lower non-basic wages. This 
observation presents a paradox that this paper would try to explain in later sections. In terms of 
non-pecuniary benefits, Muslims have a slight edge in their access to medical and social 
insurance, but this could be related to their larger concentration in the formal and government 
sector. Otherwise, the two groups receive similar non-pecuniary benefits. 
In a nutshell, there are important regional and educational variations between the two groups. 
They have similar rates of employment and labor force participation, but different distribution 
within various employment statuses and economic sectors. These variations could contribute to 
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the different magnitude and direction of wage gaps between the two groups. The existence of 
these gaps in average wages suggest that positive and negative religious discrimination could be 
playing a role in determining wages. However, it seems that religion has less importance in 
affecting the non-pecuniary benefits. 
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Chapter 5
Religious Discrimination in Wages
In order to investigate the existence and extent of religious discrimination in wages, we employ 
three analytical tools. First, we run OLS regression for different variants of Mincer’s (1974) 
equation with a dummy variable for religion. Second, we use propensity score matching on 
almost the same explanatory variables while considering Christians as the treatment group. 
Finally, we employ variants of Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition to break down the wage 
differentials into their endowment and residual components. We start by elaborating on these 
techniques, then discussing our main findings. 
5.1. Methodology
5.1a. OLS Regression Analysis
Mincer’s (1974) human capital earnings function is the basic tool for estimating the wages of 
individuals by regressing earnings on their human capital endowments represented by their years 
of schooling and experience. To avoid possible biases in estimation, Mincer’s equation 
underwent several modifications to account for non-linearity of returns to education (Solon, 
1987; Belman and Heywood, 1991; Park, 1994), selection bias (Heckman, 1974) and unobserved 
ability bias (Card, 1999). Accordingly, variants of Mincer’s equation are employed in this section 
to track the significance of the religion of individuals in explaining the variation in their wages.  
ܻ =  ߚ0 + ߚ1ܵ +  ߚ2 ܧ +  ܤ3 ܧ2 +  ݁                                                                 (5.1a.1)
ܻ =  ߚ0 + ߚ1ܵ +  ߚ2 ܧ +  ܤ3 ܧ2 +  ߚ4ܵ2 + ∑  ߙ௜ܺ௜௞௜ୀ0 + ݁                               (5.1a.2)
Equation (5.1a.1) represents linear Mincer equation with its most basic variables. Equation 
(5.1a.2) is the extended Mincer’s equation that accounts for non-linearity of education and allows 
for adding additional controls.  For this section, we use three different samples for estimating 
different variants of Mincer’s equation. The first sample is for all wage earners in regular and 
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irregular jobs, both part time and full time employees. So, we exclude employers, self-employed 
and unpaid family & subsistence workers from our main working samples due to the 
unavailability of data on their incomes. Regular wage earners are defined as those who work in 
permanent or temporary jobs, while the irregular work is in seasonal and casual jobs. Also, we 
focus only on the earnings from the primary job. Full time employees are defined as those who 
work for at least 40 hours per week. The second sample is restricted on regular wage earners and 
the third focuses on full time regular wage earners. The main dependent variables are the log of 
hourly wages and the log of monthly wages for all samples. In addition, the data contains the 
detailed composition of wages for regular wage earners in terms of their basic, non-basic, and 
total wages for the last three months. Accordingly, we run additional regressions for the second 
and third samples employing each of the log of these three types of wages as dependent 
variables.10 The main independent variable is religion of the individual which is captured through 
a dummy taking a positive value for Christians. The basic controls are years of schooling, years 
of experience, square of years of experience, square of years of schooling, gender, and region. To 
account for possible ability biases, we add controls for parental education to capture inherited 
ability. Moreover, we control for job characteristics by considering the skill level of the job, 
unionization, fulltime employment, job formality, sector of employment, and economic activity. 
We do not correct for bias due to selection into wage employment due to the lack of convenient 
instruments and the relatively small size of the sample.11 For every sample, we apply and report 
six main model specifications for each type of wages. In all these specifications, our main 
concern is the significance of the religion dummy which identifies religion-based wage 
variations, i.e. religious discrimination.   
5.1b. Propensity Score Matching
Matching has been commonly used as a complement to regression analysis in recent applied 
econometric literature (Angrist and Krueger, 1998; Brand and Halaby, 2006; Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002; Heckman, 1997; Heckman et al. 1998; Morris, 2007). Unlike regression, its main 
                                                          
10 As Card (1999) pointed out, employing different forms of wages as the dependent variables would alter the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. Accordingly, checking the findings for different forms of wages would 
enhance the robustness of our findings.  
11 We experimented with some possible instruments like parental employment status or household size, but the 
results did not change significantly.
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advantage is that it does not assume a specific functional form and so avoids bias due to 
misspecification of the model. It also does not assume that the impact of religion, belonging to 
the religious minority, is the same across the two groups, allowing for understanding group 
differences and creating counterfactual scenarios. Accordingly, we employ propensity score 
matching through matching the treated with the untreated, Christians with Muslims, in terms of a 
set of observable characteristics, and then comparing the wages of individuals from both groups 
with similar propensity scores. Propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given the pretreatment characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Once 
the scores are estimated, different methods are used to match the units from the treated and 
control groups according to them.    
To match the treatment and control units, we employ three different techniques of matching; 
nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification. Nearest neighbor matching matches every treated unit 
with a control of the nearest propensity score. Kernel matching works by matching all treated 
units with a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the 
distance between the propensity score of the treated and controls. The last technique, 
stratification, starts by dividing the range of variation of the propensity score into intervals of 
same average propensity scores for treatment and controls. Then, within each interval, the 
differences in the average outcomes of the treated and controls is computed, before estimating the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as weighted average of the ATT of each block.
Each of these methods represents a point on the tradeoff between quality and quantity of the 
matches. On one hand, in the nearest neighbor matching, all treated units find a match, but the 
quality of matching is relatively poor. Given a small sample size, this could be a good strategy to
avoid loss of observations, but at the cost of the quality of estimation. On the other hand, the 
stratification method could discard treated units that have no control available in their block. 
Unlike nearest neighbor matching, some observations would be discarded to improve the quality 
of estimation. The Kernel matching represents a middle ground as it matches all the treated with 
all the controls while paying attention to the accuracy of matching. Despite the pros and cons of 
the different techniques, none is superior over the other and it is always recommended to apply 
them to the same data to check the robustness of the results (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
Accordingly, we follow this recommendation in our analysis by applying the three techniques 
and compare their outcomes.
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In our study, for the nearest neighbor matching, the two groups are matched on the same 
variables used in the last specification of the OLS analysis. However, for kernel and stratification 
techniques, they’re matched on schooling, experience, gender, urbanization, mother’s education, 
skill level of the job, job formality, and sector of employment.12 The ATT is estimated using the 
three methods.13 In addition, we do not impose the common support restriction due to the 
relatively small size of the samples and to avoid losing high quality matches on the boundaries of 
the common support (Lechner, 2001). 
5.1c. Decomposition Analysis
As previously mentioned, despite the usefulness of OLS regression analysis in detecting possible 
discrimination, it assumes that the wage structure and the coefficients for human endowments 
and other observable characteristics are the same for both groups. If this assumption is violated, 
the OLS will lead us to inaccurate conclusions. Hence, a more detailed picture of wage 
differences between different groups in the labor market is captured by the more often used 
“decomposition techniques” in the discrimination literature. The most basic decomposition 
method was developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). It divides the wage differential 
between two groups into an “explained” part due to group differences in productivity related 
observed characteristics, and another “unexplained” part. The latter is usually attributed to 
discrimination, but it also entails other unobserved factors. This could be summarized in the 
following equation.
ܴ = ܧ ( ெܻ) −  ܧ( ஼ܻ) = { ܧ(ܺெ) −  ܧ(ܺ஼)}′ߚ∗ + ൛ ܧ(ܺெ)′(ߚெ − ߚ∗) +  ܧ(ܺ஼)′ (ߚ∗ −  ߚ஼)ൟ       (5.1c.1)
In this equation, the differential (R) in log wages (Y) of Muslims (M) and Christians (C) is 
presented. X is a vector of predictors, and ߚ stands for the vector of coefficients. The first part of 
the equation is the difference in the outcome due to differences in the predictors between the two 
groups. The second part is the “unexplained” component which is usually attributed to 
discrimination. This decomposition technique is called “twofold decomposition”. A relevant 
debate to this method is the estimation of ߚ∗. Oaxaca (1973) suggested using the coefficients of 
the discriminated group. However, Cotton (1988) pointed out that an undervaluation of a group 
                                                          
12 This change is aimed at satisfying the balancing property for the propensity scores.
13 The standard errors for these two methods are computed using bootstrap replications.
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comes with overvaluation of the other. So, his suggestion is to employ the weighted average of 
the coefficients of both groups. Neumark (1988) proposed using a pooled regression of both 
groups for estimating ߚ∗. Jann (2008) highlighted that the pooled approach could lead to 
overestimation of the explained part which should be tackled by adding a group indicator in the 
pooled model as an additional covariate. We follow this last approach in our estimation of the 
twofold decomposition. 
Another way to analyze the wage differential is the threefold decomposition. As shown in 
equation (5.1c.2), this technique breaks down the differential to three parts; endowments effect, 
the coefficients effect, and an interaction effect for the simultaneous existence of the previous 
two effects between the two groups (Jones and Kelly, 1984; Daymont and Andrisani, 1984; Jann, 
2008). 
ܴ = ܧ ( ெܻ) −  ܧ( ஼ܻ) = { ܧ(ܺெ) −  ܧ(ܺ஼)}′ߚ஼ + ܧ (ܺ஼)′(ߚெ − ߚ஼) + {ܧ(ܺெ) −  ܧ(ܺ஼)}′(ߚெ − ߚ஼)                                                                                                                 
(5.1c.2)
This equation is expressed from the view point of the Christian group. For instance, the first 
component predicts the change in the mean earnings of Christians if they had the same 
predictors’ level of their Muslim counterparts. The second part captures the expected change in 
Christians’ mean earnings if they had the same coefficients of Muslim, i.e. received the same 
returns to their endowments. Unlike the twofold decomposition, the main advantage of this 
method is that it doesn’t entail an assumption on the value of ߚ.  We employ this method as our 
main reference for decomposition analysis to avoid the effects of the assumptions on ߚ. However, 
we report the results of the twofold decomposition and comment on them whenever they’re more 
insightful. 
Similar to our previous analyses, we apply the decomposition techniques on three samples; all 
wage earners, regular wage earners, and full time regular wage earners. Both monthly and hourly 
wages are studied for the three samples. Besides that, differences in quarterly basic, non-basic, 
and total wages are investigated for the second and third samples. In addition, two model 
specifications are used for decomposition; simple and extended. For the extended form, the set of 
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predictors14 includes schooling, experience, parental education, region, gender, sector of 
employment, formality of employment, economic activity, unionization, and skill level of the 
job.15 For the basic form, only years of schooling, experience, gender, region, formality, sector of 
employment and unionization are used as explanatory variables. 
5.2. Main Findings
Taking the OLS analysis as a starting point, tables (5.2.1) to (5.2.12) show that the coefficient of 
religion is insignificant in almost all the models of hourly and monthly wages for the three 
samples. The sign of the coefficient is positive which indicates that even if the difference were to 
be significant, it would be in favor of Christians.16 This indicates no religious discrimination in 
both monthly and hourly wages. The story is a bit more different for the detailed wages. 
Although religion does not explain variations in total quarterly wages, for the second and third 
samples it has significant and opposite impacts on the basic and non-basic components of 
quarterly wages. In the case of regular wage earners, the religion dummy has a significant 
positive impact ranging from 24 to 16 percent on basic wages, and a negative impact in-between 
77 and 70 percent on non-basic wages. Similarly, for the regular full time wage earners, being 
Christian increases the basic wages by amount ranging from 25 to 15 percent, and decreases the 
non-basic wages by amount in-between 90 to 83 percent. However, given these opposite 
directions and the relative sizes of both components, the final outcome on the total quarterly 
wages is insignificant. So, the OLS analysis pinpoints that religion does not affect monthly, 
hourly, and total quarterly wages. On the other hand, Christians enjoy a positive advantage in 
basic quarterly wages and face severe disadvantage in non-basic quarterly wages. 
The results from matching, in table (5.2.13), are relatively close to the ones from OLS analysis, 
despite the existence of some differences. Firstly, the ATT obtained from nearest neighbor 
matching indicates no significant impact of religion on hourly and monthly wages for the three 
                                                          
14 We also add full time employment and stability of employment as controls in some samples to align the findings 
with those obtained from OLS and matching. 
15 An important concern in decomposition technique is that the decomposition results depend on the choice of 
omitted group on the usage of dummies for categorical variables (Jones, 1983; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999, Nielsen, 
2000; Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2004; Yun, 2005b; Jann, 2008). As we employ a set of categorical predictors, we 
correct for this problem in our estimation using the deviation contrast transform.
16 In general, being experienced educated male worker in the formal sector working in a skill-requiring job in the 
cities is likely to increase both monthly wages and hourly wages.   
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samples. As exceptions, the ATT is significantly positive for monthly wages of the first sample 
and hourly wages for the third sample. Interestingly, the ATT for non-basic and total quarterly 
wages are insignificant. Yet, there is a positive differential in favor of Christians in basic wages 
of about 19 and 25 percent for the second and the third samples, respectively. Secondly, Kernel 
matching indicates positive discrimination in monthly and hourly wages for the first sample, and 
hourly wages for the third sample. Basic wages are higher for Christians by 15 and 18 percent for 
the second and third samples, respectively. Non-basic wages are lower for the Christians by 52 
and 76 percent for the same two samples. Still, religion does not affect the total quarterly wages. 
Thirdly, stratification matching shows no significant ATT on monthly, hourly, basic and total 
quarterly wages for the relevant samples. Yet, it asserts the negative ATT for non-basic wages 
which accounts for 59 and 83 percent for the second and third samples. Despite being close, these 
results seem hard to reconcile. However, there is convergence between at least two techniques 
out of the three on the ATT of a certain wage. So, as a generalization, there is no significant ATT 
in terms of monthly and hourly wages for the three samples with monthly wages for the first 
sample and hourly wages for the third sample as exceptions. For basic and non-basic wages, there 
is positive edge for Christians in the first and negative edge in the second, but the magnitudes are 
slightly lower than those obtained from the OLS estimations. 
The decomposition of wage differentials between the two groups provide clearer picture on their 
sources. The tables from (5.2.14) to (5.2.17) indicate that there is positive wage differential in 
favor Christians for both monthly and hourly wages across all samples. This ranges from 16 to 20 
percent for monthly wages and 14 to 22 percent in hourly wages. At first glance, the simple 
threefold decomposition indicates that most of the differential is driven by differences in returns 
to endowments. However, once we control for parental education, economic activity, and skill 
level of the job, at least half of the variation could be explained in terms of endowments rather 
than their returns. Endowments' contribution ranges from 11 to 16 percent for monthly wages and 
from 7 to 12 percent for hourly wages versus about 7 to 9 percent for coefficients' contribution to 
both monthly and hourly wage differentials. This indicates that the wage differentials are created 
by variations in endowments which come in favor of Christians, but also without ignoring the 
existence of positive discrimination in their favor. 
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Regarding the results of decomposing the detailed wages presented in the tables from (5.2.18) to 
(5.2.21), there are significant wage differentials in basic, non-basic, and total quarterly wages for 
the second and third samples. For the second sample, the differential is about 25, 61, and 17 
percent for the three forms of wages, respectively. For the third sample, they’re slightly higher to 
be 28, 73, and 20 percent, respectively. Starting from the total wages, endowments explain the 
larger portion of the difference for both samples. In contrast, the differential in basic and non-
basic wages is mostly determined by differences in returns to endowments. The coefficient 
component of basic wages is significant and positive for both samples which reassures the 
positive discrimination in favor of Christians. The decomposition of non-basic wage differentials 
gives more subtle results. The threefold decomposition indicates almost equal and significant
contributions by both endowments and their returns to the differential. However, the results from 
the twofold decomposition indicate that the differential is mostly derived by the unexplained 
component rather than endowments. In fact, the explained component has similar sign to that of 
other forms of wages indicating the persistence of the endowments’ advantage. So, non-basic 
wage differential is mostly caused by discrimination. As mentioned previously, the results of the 
twofold decomposition could be affected by the assumptions on ߚ. So, one could claim that at 
least half of the variation in non-basic wages between the two groups could not be explained by 
differences in endowments. 
5.3. Discussion
The evidence from OLS and matching suggests that there is no impact of religion on monthly, 
hourly, and total quarterly wages for the different samples, with few exceptions. However, 
Christians are more likely to receive higher basic wages and lower non-basic wages. The size of 
the non-basic wage component is small relative to the basic one, but the impact of religion on 
basic wages is almost the third of that on the non-basic. 
The decomposition analysis presents a more insightful picture. Wage differentials in favor of 
Christians persist for hourly, monthly, and total quarterly wages. These differentials are largely 
explained by Christians’ advantage in endowments rather than discrimination. Yet, positive 
discrimination in favor of Christians still contributes to the difference. This positive 
discrimination component could be due to unobserved factors that are not captured by the model. 
For example, Christians could prefer working in Christian owned businesses. If these businesses 
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are more successful than their Muslim counterparts, then they would pay higher wages for their 
employees. Accordingly, Christians would receive higher wages than Muslims even in similar 
occupations and activities due to the relatively better performance of their businesses. Although 
this is hard to prove using the data in hand, there are reasons to suggest this explanation. First, 
Christian businessmen has shown great success with their businesses contributing to important 
sectors in the Egyptian economy. The Sawiris family in Egypt, the richest, with their businesses 
in construction and telecommunication is the best, though not the only, example. Also, we 
elaborated in the descriptive statistics section that Christians have higher tendency than Muslims 
to be employers than wage employees which could also hint on their relative positive historical 
experience as entrepreneurs. Second, the majority of the Christian population either lives or 
comes from Upper Egypt. This region is known for its strong family ties that are close to the 
notion of tribal ties. This indicates that a large proportion of Christian businesses could be family 
based which implies that Christian employees are more likely to work in Christian businesses. 
Third, being a minority that suffers discrimination would intensify the communal sense among 
Christians which could direct them to pool their resources to empower themselves. This last 
factor predicts their high cooperation and business clustering relative to the Muslim majority.17
So, it is possible that this combination of religious ties, business clustering, and relative business 
success is what enhances Christian incomes.       
With regard to basic and non-basic wages, wage differentials are also significant, but they are 
mostly explained by differences in returns to endowments. Christians seem to enjoy positive 
discrimination that fuels at least half of the gap in basic wages. Although their advantage in 
endowments is persistent for non-basic wages, the extent of negative discrimination is very high 
that it takes over this advantage. Having said that, it has to be reasserted that the discrimination 
component might be overestimated due to the model’s failure to capture any unobserved 
characteristics.  
These findings impose a puzzle. Religion does not seem to have a significant effect on any of the 
final forms of wages; hourly, monthly, and total quarterly. However, it plays a role in 
determining the composition of these wages; basic and non-basic. Christians have a positive edge 
                                                          
17 A good comparable situation is the growth of Islamists’ businesses in Egypt. Due to their political activism, they 
faced different forms of discrimination that pushed them to establish their own business communities. Their 
clustering, success, and their “almost minority” situation resembled the Christian situation.   
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in basic wages, but a negative one in non-basic wages. Also, the differentials in basic and non-
basic wages are largely driven by the unexplained component. This necessitates asking why 
religion plays a role in determining the composition, rather than the sum, of these wages and why 
its impact on basic and non-basic components goes in opposite directions.  
As it is previously mentioned, this unexplained component could entail discrimination or any 
unobserved characteristics that are not captured by our model. We argue that there are strong 
reasons to believe in the latter. The explanation starts by differentiating between two types of 
jobs; one that pays zero non-basic wages, and the other pays positive non-basic wages. By 
investigating the characteristics of these two sets of jobs, we find important differences. The jobs 
that pay zero non-basic wages pays significantly higher basic wages and vice versa. The 
difference in mean basic wages between zero and positive non-basic wage receivers is around 
L.E. 1000. In other words, there is a tradeoff between basic and non-basic wages. Table (5.3.1) 
clarifies this tradeoff. The Christians’ positive wage advantage is due to their higher 
concentration in the zero non-basic wage sector which also rewards with higher basic wages. In 
numbers, 77 percent of Christians work in zero non-basic wage jobs versus 71 percent of 
Muslims. So, for instance, when we restrict the second sample to positive non-basic wage sector, 
we find that the religion coefficient in the OLS analysis is insignificant. This indicates that the 
seemingly Christians’ disadvantage in non-basic wages is more likely to be driven by higher 
concentration in certain jobs rather than actual discrimination in payment.18 The same reasoning 
applies to their advantage in basic wages which explains the opposing impacts of religion on both 
components. 
The question that follows is why Christians are more concentrated in the zero non-basic wage 
sector than the positively paying non-basic wage sector. The two tracks are different in their main 
sector of employment, occupations, and economic activities. While the first is mostly private 
(69%), the latter is mostly government sector (64%). Professional, service & sales, and plant & 
machine operation jobs represent half the occupations with zero non-basic wages, but also with 
high basic wages. On the other hand, professionals, technicians and associate professionals 
                                                          
18 When we restrict the sample for positive non-basic wage earners and take basic wages and non-basic wages as 
independent variables, we find that the religion coefficient is insignificant, but its sign is negative for non-basic 
wages and positive for basic wages. Focusing on the sign of the coefficient rather than significance, one could claim, 
generally speaking, Christians prefer jobs with the structure of higher share of basic component and lower share of 
non-basic wages. 
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represent 60 percent of the positive non-basic wages sector.  Accordingly, it follows that 
education (34%), manufacturing (15%) and public administration (16%) are the top activities of 
the positive non-basic wage sector, while manufacturing (20%), whole sale and retail (13%), and 
education (12%) represent around half of the zero non-basic wage sector. In addition, the average 
years of schooling is higher in the positive non-basic wage sector than its counterpart, while the 
average years of experience is less. This is a reflection of the types of activities and occupations 
that dominates the two sectors. 
Given these characteristics, the concentration difference could be driven by two main 
mechanisms; inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral. In other words, religion of individuals could sort 
them into government or private sector which affects their non-basic wages, or it could allocate 
them into the two categories of non-basic wages within private and government sectors. To 
investigate both mechanisms, we’ll start our analysis by the intra-sectoral allocation of labor. By 
looking at the averages, without any controls, Christians’ concentration in the zero non-basic 
wage sector is 6 % and 10% higher than their Muslim counterparts in the private sector and 
government sector, respectively. If controls for education, experience, region, parental 
background and gender were introduced, being a Christian reduces the likelihood of receiving 
positive non-basic wages by 16 percent in the government sector and 9 percent in the private 
sector. However, once controls for occupation and economic activity are added, the religion 
coefficient is insignificant.19 This indicates that the intra-sectoral distribution of the receivers of 
zero and positive non-basic wages is better explained by their occupations and economic 
activities than religion. Similarly, if government and private sectors are pooled and human capital 
variables were controlled, Christians are less likely to receive positive non-basic wages by 14 
percent. Even if controls for economic activity, occupation, and interacting religion with sector of 
employment were added, the significance of religion persists. Yet, including sector of 
employment into the model eliminates the significance of religion. Being in the government 
sector increases the probability of receiving positive non-basic wages by 13 percent. This 
pinpoints to the fact that affecting the probability of getting into the government sector would 
affect the likelihood of receiving positive non-basic wages. Accordingly, a probit model is run to 
investigate this channel. We found that being a Christian significantly decreases the likelihood of 
                                                          
19 These results are obtained using probit models in table (5.3.2). 
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joining the government sector by about 7 percent, controlling for the main human capital 
characteristics and family background. This indicates that the distribution of the two groups 
between government and private sectors is likely to be an influential channel which shapes the 
receipt of non-basic wages and the level of basic wages. 
Although OLS, matching, and decomposition results highlight opposite directions of religious 
discrimination in basic wages and non-basic wages, the previous analysis indicates that the story 
could be less relevant to wage discrimination. The probability of receiving zero non-basic wages 
and high basic wages, or positive non-basic wages and low basic wages is determined by the 
sector of employment. Also, within each sector, it is determined by the occupation and economic 
activity of the job. Given that Muslims and Christians have different levels of concentration in 
various employment sectors, occupations, and economic activities, their likelihood of receiving 
the two wage structures is different.20 The different sectoral distribution between the two groups 
could be a matter of personal preferences, or discrimination, or any other unobserved factors like 
personal networks. For instance, Christians could prefer to work in the private sector due to its 
relative flexibility and chances of growth by clustering their businesses. Also, their high 
concentration in private sector could be due to discrimination in access to employment in the 
government sector. These unobserved factors could elaborate the unexplained component in the 
decomposition results. Accordingly, further investigation of the factors that determines selection 
of the two groups into these specific sectors, occupations, and economic activities could enrich 
the analysis. However, given the lack of convenient instruments, we couldn’t conduct these 
further corrections for selection in different models.21 As a bottom line, the wage differentials in 
basic and non-basic wages should be considered in their context and within the whole picture. 
Having done that, it is hard to claim the existence of religious discrimination in both. In other 
words, if discrimination is to play a role, it is in the channeling of the two groups into different 
tracks of employment with different wage composition rather than issuing different paychecks for 
the same work. So, even if the different sectoral choices were due to discrimination, the results 
                                                          
20 However, it is to be noted that controls for occupation, economic activity, sector of employment, formality, and 
skill level of the job still fail to capture the difference in job characteristics and alter the significance of religion or 
discrimination when included during OLS, Matching, and decomposition analyses. 
21 We could not find an instrument that predicts selection without being correlated with wages. Experimenting with 
some household factors and parental characteristics did not produce any mentionable results. 
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show that there are ways to escape from this discrimination and end up having the same overall 
earnings.    
To sum up, there is no evidence of religious discrimination against Christians in terms of wages. 
On the contrary, they enjoy a positive edge that could be explained by their advantage in 
endowments without ignoring their higher returns as well. In addition, Christians and Muslims 
have different dominant forms of wage composition which is highly shaped by the two groups’ 
variation in sector of employment, occupations, and economic activities.     
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Chapter 6
Alternative Venues for Discrimination
The wage analysis highlighted the inexistence of discrimination against Christians. Yet, the 
evidence on wages does not fully negate any claims of discrimination in the labor market. 
Discriminatory practices could take place in offering different levels of non-pecuniary benefits to 
the two groups, or subjecting individuals to different treatment and work conditions in the 
workplace. Furthermore, discrimination could hinder access to employment at the first place, or 
act as a channeling factor of the two groups into different paths in the labor market. If these were 
to be taken into consideration, discrimination in wages will not give the full picture. Accordingly, 
this section provides preliminary investigation of other possible forms of discrimination in non-
pecuniary benefits, working conditions, and access to employment. 
6.1. Non-Pecuniary Benefits
Although wages represent the main return to labor, the additional non-pecuniary benefits received 
by workers affect their total welfare. An ideal job would pay higher wages as well as a generous 
package of social and medical insurance to protect workers from hazardous events. Furthermore, 
the ability to have paid vacations and sick leaves are all determinants of the quality of the job. In 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) terms, these factors would contribute to the workers’ ability to 
“decommodify” themselves. Given the importance of the non-pecuniary component of job 
benefits, discrimination in its receipt is no less relevant to the level of welfare of individuals than 
wages. So, to complement our analysis, we examine the possibility of religious discrimination in 
non-pecuniary benefits. 
There are four main benefits that constitute our study of non-pecuniary benefits; social insurance, 
medical insurance, paid vacations, and sick leaves. Two main methods are applied to investigate 
the impact of worker’s religion on receiving these benefits. First, we construct a score for non-
pecuniary benefits that takes the values from 0 to 4, where 0 receives no benefits at all and 4 
receives all the four benefits. The incidence of receiving each benefit is represented by a dummy 
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that takes the value of one for positive receipt of the benefit in the primary job. The non-
pecuniary benefits score is the summation of the four dummies. Then, we regress the score on 
two model specifications using OLS analysis. The first specification controls for the basic human 
capital and demographic characteristics. The second specification contains additional variables 
for parental background and job characteristics. We include the religion dummy in both 
specifications to capture its sign and significance. On one hand, this method is basic and simple 
to give an initial idea on differences in receiving non-pecuniary benefits between the two groups. 
On the other hand, it treats all the non-pecuniary benefits equally which undermines the fact that 
some are more important than others. For instance, receiving social and medical insurance is 
more important to the welfare of individuals and their families than getting paid vacations. To 
account for this, we use a second method to look at each benefit separately with the incidence of 
the benefit as the independent variable. Probit models, with the two previous specifications, are 
employed for each benefit. Again, the dummy for religion is our main variable of concern. 
The results from the OLS analysis presented in the tables from (6.1.1) to (6.1.3) show no impact 
of religion on the total non-pecuniary benefits received by the worker. Yet, the sign of the 
religion coefficient is negative which indicates that if the results were to be significant, Christians 
would receive less non-pecuniary benefits than their Muslim counterparts. Moreover, the model 
indicates that non-pecuniary benefits are higher for females which might be due to their tendency 
to receive more maternal benefits. Also, they increase with more schooling and experience. 
Unionization, sector formality, and working in the government sector contribute significantly to 
the receipt of non-pecuniary benefits as well. Similarly, the findings from the probit models on 
the separate benefits are along the same lines. Although the coefficient of religion has a negative 
sign, it is not significant in any of the models for the different benefits. 
In a nutshell, despite the fact that Christians might be receiving less non-pecuniary benefits, the 
difference is insignificant. This negates the existence of discrimination in non-pecuniary benefits. 
6.2. Level of Job Satisfaction and Working Conditions 
The preceding analysis of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits provides an objective point 
of view on discrimination in the market. However, discrimination is also a subjective 
phenomenon that relates to individual’s satisfaction with the working conditions and returns to 
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labor. If the worker faces discrimination at work, it is likely to be reflected on her levels of job 
satisfaction. Accordingly, as a complementary to our analysis of job benefits and work 
environment, we compare the levels of satisfaction of both groups for a set of work and labor 
market characteristics. It is to be noted that the questions were asked without having religious 
discrimination on the minds of the respondents. In one way, this could lead to overestimation of 
the levels of satisfaction as respondents might not exert effort in recalling incidents of 
discrimination, but also has the advantage of capturing the average experience and ignoring the 
extremes. 
Respondents were asked about their overall level of job satisfaction and their levels of 
satisfaction for job security, earnings, type of work, number of working hours, work schedule, 
working conditions, distance to job, and matching between job and qualifications. In any of these 
factors, discrimination can have an evident role. For example, the minority worker could be 
assigned worse working schedule, or be forced to work in bad conditions or far regions. Also, 
discrimination in the labor market could push the minority worker to work in less preferred jobs 
or ones that do not match her qualifications to avoid unemployment. In that sense, the level of 
personal satisfaction would reflect these possible situations. 
Generally speaking, table (6.2.1) highlights that Christians are more satisfied with their jobs. 
Around 83 percent of Christians are satisfied with their jobs versus 71 percent for Muslims. This 
advantage persists even after controlling for other relevant factors as Christians’ satisfaction is 
higher by about 37 percent as shown in table (6.2.2). For the detailed job characteristics and 
working conditions, Christians show higher levels of satisfaction in all of them. More explicitly, 
they have higher levels of satisfaction in job security (6%), earnings (5%), type of work (12%), 
number of working hours (5%), work schedule (3%), working environment (6%), distance to job 
(8%), and matching between job and qualifications (6%).22 Although the differences are not 
large, it negates the idea that Christians are less satisfied with their labor conditions. 
In a nutshell, there are no major differences in the levels of job satisfaction between the two 
groups. This is a continuation of the previous results on wages and non-pecuniary benefits. 
Altogether, they undermine the claim that religious discrimination in treatment occurs in the 
workplace. 
                                                          
22 These values are the difference between summation of “rather satisfied” and “fully satisfied” for both groups. 
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6.3. Access to Employment
One reason why it might be hard to observe discrimination in wages and non-pecuniary benefits 
is that discrimination could have occurred one step ahead. In other words, discrimination could 
take place in access to employment rather than in treatment of the employees. In fact, 
discrimination on gates of employment could be easier in practice as the benefits of employment 
are governed by stricter rules especially in the formal sector. Simply, rejecting a job applicant 
requires less justification than paying him differently. We identify four main labor market 
checkpoints where discrimination could take place; labor force participation, employment, wage 
employment, and government sector employment. Then, we trace the evidence for religious 
discrimination in access to any of these tracks. 
If discrimination at the gates of employment is widely practiced in the market, this could lead to 
four main observations. Firstly, labor force participation rates for the minority group might 
decline due to the increasing number of discouraged workers. Secondly, the unemployment rate 
would be higher for the minority group. Thirdly, the minority would try to create their own 
businesses instead of knocking the closed doors. Thus, we would observe shifting of the minority 
from wage employment towards being employers or self-employed. This could undermine the 
impact of discrimination on labor force participation and employment rates. Fourthly, even if the 
minority managed to access wage employment on equal grounds, discrimination could channel 
them into specific sectors that are less controlled by the majority. So, access to wage employment 
by itself would give us a deceptive idea about what happens in the market and the practice of 
discrimination. Furthermore, the treatment in terms of wages and other benefits could be different 
within each sector which would make access to different tracks of employment not informative 
enough on discrimination. This presentation emphasizes that any understanding of the incidence
and extent of discrimination in the labor market could not be well accomplished without tracing 
the individual from the moment she becomes a member in the working population till receiving 
her monthly checks and benefits. Discrimination could take place at all stages of decision making 
in the labor market which compose the pieces of the puzzle. 
To assess discrimination at these different stages, we use a set of probit models. The dependent 
variables are dummies that take positive values for not being in the labor force, being 
unemployed member of the labor force, being employed member of the working population, 
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being a wage employee, and being wage employee in the government sector. The main controls 
are demographic and human capital characteristics. Also, a special attention is paid to parental 
background by including parents’ education, their employment status, and father’s occupation. 
The main rationale behind this is the large role of the family in facilitating access to employment 
and influencing labor market decisions. 
The results, summarized in tables (6.3.1) and (6.3.2), of our analysis indicate that religion does 
not affect the individual’s chance in getting into the labor force or being employed. However, it 
has an influence on access to wage employment and government sector. Being a Christian 
reduces the probability of getting into the wage employment significantly by about 9 percent. 
This reflects on Christians’ higher probability of being employers or work in the unpaid family 
and subsistence work. They are more likely to be employers by 4 percent and unpaid and 
subsistence workers by 4.5 percent. Furthermore, within the wage employment, Christians are 
less likely to work in the government sector by about 7 percent which leads to their higher 
concentration in the private sector. 
Given these findings, one could see that religion is irrelevant to labor force participation or 
employment. Instead of affecting access to general employment, religion channels individuals to 
certain tracks in the labor market. More explicitly, it directs Christians away from employment in 
the wage sector in general and its governmental jobs in particular. It is hard to tell whether this 
observation is a consequence of discrimination or personal and communal preferences. Still, 
religious discrimination in access to these tracks poses itself as a relevant explanation. 
6.4. Summary 
Similar to wages, there is no evidence of religious discrimination in non-pecuniary benefits and 
working conditions. Also, religion does not play a role in influencing the decision to join the 
labor force or the probability of employment. On the contrary, religion impacts access to wage 
employment, especially its governmental sector. As Christians are less likely to join wage 
employment and government sector, religious discrimination is suggested as a possible 
explanation for that observation. Also, if we consider the attractiveness of government jobs due 
to their better social safety nets and working conditions, discrimination could be a serious 
concern.
36
Chapter 7
Conclusions for the Ongoing Debate
The goal of this study was to provide pioneering empirical evidence on religious discrimination 
in the labor market using various techniques of statistical analysis. Discrimination in the labor 
market could take place in different forms; wages, non-pecuniary benefits, job conditions, and 
access to employment. Our investigation suggests no religious discrimination in wages, non-
pecuniary benefits, and job conditions in the Egyptian labor market. In these aspects, Muslim and 
Christian workers are on the same grounds. In addition, the religion of individuals does not affect 
their probability of joining the labor force or finding employment. Yet, religion plays a role in 
channeling both groups in different tracks in the labor market. Christians are less likely to join the 
wage employment compared to Muslims. Instead, they participate more in the labor market as 
employers and unpaid family & subsistence workers. Within the wage employment, Christians 
are also less likely to work in the government sector compared to Muslims with the same 
observed characteristics. The difference in labor market paths taken by the two groups proposes 
religious discrimination as a potential explanation.  
These results enlighten the debate on religious discrimination in the labor market. It defines areas 
where discrimination may be taking place. The claim that Christians have less accessibility to the 
government sector is supported by our analysis. However, the proposition of discrimination in the 
workplace is negated. The results show that Christians and Muslims receive equal levels of 
wages, medical and social insurance, and even vacations and sick leaves. Christians are also more 
satisfied with their working conditions than their Muslim counterparts. Combined, these factors 
represent most of the possible important aspects of the relation between the employee and the 
workplace. The last main form of discrimination that was raised is the existence of “glass ceiling” 
against Christians in the government sector. Due to data limitations and the small size of the 
sample, we could not investigate this point which remains an open possibility of discrimination. 
Finally, the main policy recommendation of this study is to set clear cut rules in government 
employment to limit the potential of religious discrimination.         
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Appendix
Table (4.2.1): Sample Size
  
Table (4.2.2): General Descriptive Statistics
Muslims Christians Total
% % %
Gender24
Females 59.7 60.4 59.8
Males 40.3 39.6 40.2
Region
Greater Cairo 15.8 16.1 15.8
Alex, Suez Canal 7.0 9.9 7.2
Urban Lower 10.0 5.7 9.7
Urban Upper 6.2 16.0 6.8
Rural Lower 35.3 5.4 33.7
Rural Upper 25.7 47.0 26.8
Level of Educational Attainment
Illiterate 18.9 24.5 19.2
Reads & Writes 3.4 1.2 3.3
Less than Intermediate 17.0 9.7 16.6
Intermediate 39.7 40.5 39.7
Above Intermediate 3.6 3.5 3.6
University 16.5 20.1 16.7
                                                          
23 Standard unemployment definition such that search is required and the individual is missing if out of the labor 
force.
24 The male/female ratio estimated here represents only the portion of the sample of all ever married individuals aged 
18-39. This is different from the male/female ratio of the whole population which is split almost equal to one. 
Muslims Christians Total
Total Sample 11611 683 12294
Not in the labor force 5150 310 5461
Unemployed23 556 35 591
Working 5567 338 5905
Wage Earner 4350 233 4583
Regular Wage Earners 3194 173 3367
Full Time Regular Wage Earners 2477 128 2605
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Post Graduate 0.9 0.5 0.9
Employment 
Labor Force Participation Rate 53.8 51.8 53.7
Employment Rate 89.4 91.5 89.5
Table (4.2.3): Descriptive Statistics of Employment and Job Characteristics
Muslims Christians Total
% % %
Employment Status
Wage Employee 65.1 59.8 64.8
Employer 7.0 12.6 7.3
Self-Employed 8.5 9.2 8.5
Unpaid Family Worker 19.4 18.5 19.4
Job Formality
Informal 57.3 61.9 57.6
Formal 42.7 38.1 42.4
Economic Sector
Government 19.9 16.8 19.7
Public 3.4 1.6 3.3
Private 75.0 79.9 75.2
Investment 1.3 1.6 1.3
International 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 0.4 0.2 0.3
Job Stability
Permanent 73.9 75.9 74.0
Temporary 7.6 8.2 7.7
Seasonal 0.5 0.8 0.6
Casual 17.9 15.1 17.8
Incidence Rates of Additional Job Characteristics 
Work Social Insurance 39.5 34.7 39.2
Medical Insurance 33.7 29.0 33.5
Sick Leave 45.3 45.1 45.3
Paid Leave 46.4 47.3 46.4
Table (4.2.4): Descriptive Statistics of Wages and Human Capital Characteristics 
Muslims Christians Total
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Hourly Wages (L.E) 6.22 15.92 7.02 6.49 6.26 15.6
Monthly Wages (L.E) 1111.7 1247.54 1360.9 1340.16 1123.15 1252.89
Total Quarterly Wages (L.E) 3483.56 4126.86 4443.04 4383.3 3527.68 4143.26
Basic Quarterly Wages (L.E) 3082.84 3989.19 4233.43 4397.56 3135.75 4015.48
Non-Basic Quarterly Wages (L.E) 400.72 1304.82 209.6 671.39 391.93 1283.14
Years of Schooling 9.3 4.9 9.2 5.4 9.3 5
Years of Experience 12.3 6.9 13.1 7 12.4 6.9
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Table (5.2.1): OLS Analysis of Monthly Wages for All Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.148* 0.102 0.0982 0.0923 0.0809 0.0736
(2.25) (1.65) (1.63) (1.54) (1.42) (1.31)
Years of Schooling 0.0314*** -0.0331*** -0.0229** -0.0190* -0.0308*** -0.0230**
(10.06) (-3.65) (-2.59) (-2.20) (-3.57) (-2.67)
Work Experience 0.0536*** 0.0346*** 0.0376*** 0.0295*** 0.0393*** 0.0299***
(7.36) (5.06) (5.57) (4.58) (6.01) (4.80)
Square Experience -0.00132*** -0.000845*** -0.000886*** -0.000697** -0.000872*** -0.000646**
(-5.10) (-3.37) (-3.58) (-2.93) (-3.70) (-2.84)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00369*** 0.00271*** 0.00191*** 0.00345*** 0.00240***
(7.29) (5.61) (3.90) (7.20) (4.91)
Male 0.369*** 0.403*** 0.354*** 0.241*** 0.214***
(10.94) (12.48) (11.00) (6.70) (6.23)
Greater Cairo 0.0102 -0.0234 -0.0181 -0.0450 -0.0224
(0.19) (-0.46) (-0.38) (-0.91) (-0.47)
Urban Lower -0.223*** -0.222*** -0.189*** -0.204*** -0.156***
(-4.61) (-4.62) (-4.21) (-4.32) (-3.51)
Urban Upper -0.216*** -0.208*** -0.124** -0.150** -0.0659
(-4.58) (-4.40) (-2.71) (-3.23) (-1.45)
Rural Lower -0.276*** -0.244*** -0.173*** -0.198*** -0.128**
(-6.50) (-5.67) (-4.30) (-4.66) (-3.20)
Rural Upper -0.211*** -0.175*** -0.0493 -0.116* -0.00360
(-4.62) (-3.78) (-1.08) (-2.52) (-0.08)
Skill 1 0.142*** 0.107***
(6.26) (4.47)
Skill 2 0.103*** 0.0932***
(3.71) (3.45)
Job Formality -0.00385 0.0676*
(-0.13) (1.97)
Unionization 0.152*** 0.180***
(4.71) (5.69)
Full Time 0.249*** 0.150***
(8.31) (5.18)
Government Sector 0.0393 -0.0374
(0.80) (-0.72)
_cons 6.011*** 6.224*** 6.120*** 5.959*** 6.067*** 6.081***
(97.77) (79.53) (76.98) (71.74) (72.19) (68.47)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 4521 4521 4521 4521 4521 4521
R2 0.058 0.127 0.151 0.204 0.192 0.236
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.2): OLS Analysis of Hourly Wages for All Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.123* 0.0738 0.0705 0.0802 0.0660 0.0672
(2.37) (1.49) (1.46) (1.67) (1.41) (1.49)
Years of Schooling 0.0304*** -0.0406*** -0.0338*** -0.0213** -0.0322*** -0.0226***
(11.80) (-5.96) (-5.08) (-3.19) (-4.86) (-3.42)
Work Experience 0.0368*** 0.0338*** 0.0359*** 0.0272*** 0.0358*** 0.0276***
(6.75) (6.32) (6.79) (5.30) (6.79) (5.50)
Square Experience -0.000949*** -0.000909*** -0.000935*** -0.000709*** -0.000916*** -0.000675***
(-4.98) (-4.75) (-4.95) (-3.86) (-4.96) (-3.81)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00400*** 0.00329*** 0.00211*** 0.00337*** 0.00240***
(9.80) (8.48) (5.24) (8.43) (5.96)
Male 0.113*** 0.139*** 0.210*** 0.0673* 0.103***
(3.91) (4.99) (7.35) (2.13) (3.43)
Greater Cairo 0.0196 -0.0115 -0.000971 -0.0125 -0.00794
(0.46) (-0.29) (-0.03) (-0.32) (-0.21)
Urban Lower -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.121** -0.110**
(-3.55) (-3.63) (-3.73) (-3.08) (-2.95)
Urban Upper -0.148*** -0.141*** -0.155*** -0.114** -0.109**
(-4.01) (-3.79) (-4.31) (-3.07) (-3.03)
Rural Lower -0.184*** -0.163*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.118***
(-5.65) (-4.91) (-4.66) (-4.25) (-3.68)
Rural Upper -0.0776* -0.0513 -0.0618 -0.0445 -0.0302
(-2.22) (-1.44) (-1.76) (-1.23) (-0.86)
Skill 1 0.100*** 0.0708***
(5.66) (3.76)
Skill 2 0.0925*** 0.0856***
(3.97) (3.74)
Job Formality 0.0275 0.0778**
(1.07) (2.70)
Unionization 0.131*** 0.158***
(4.61) (5.57)
Full Time -0.252*** -0.329***
(-8.11) (-10.09)
Government Sector 0.0441 -0.0258
(1.07) (-0.62)
_cons 1.146*** 1.404*** 1.326*** 1.416*** 1.337*** 1.529***
(23.42) (23.53) (21.62) (21.16) (20.01) (20.94)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 4521 4521 4521 4521 4521 4521
R2 0.068 0.122 0.144 0.216 0.175 0.251
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.3): OLS Analysis of Monthly Wages for Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.148 0.121 0.118 0.112 0.0838 0.0842
(1.92) (1.73) (1.72) (1.68) (1.30) (1.32)
Years of Schooling 0.0373*** -0.0298** -0.0222* -0.0183 -0.0248* -0.0193*
(10.11) (-2.93) (-2.24) (-1.89) (-2.54) (-1.97)
Work Experience 0.0664*** 0.0424*** 0.0449*** 0.0403*** 0.0470*** 0.0406***
(8.47) (5.75) (6.17) (5.81) (6.74) (6.10)
Square Experience -0.00170*** -0.00107*** -0.00108*** -0.000985*** -0.00106*** -0.000928***
(-5.84) (-3.79) (-3.88) (-3.69) (-4.11) (-3.70)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00353*** 0.00270*** 0.00198*** 0.00335*** 0.00240***
(6.37) (5.13) (3.77) (6.46) (4.49)
Male 0.373*** 0.405*** 0.356*** 0.223*** 0.212***
(11.11) (12.63) (10.89) (6.28) (6.16)
Greater Cairo 0.0449 0.00393 0.00838 -0.00831 0.00670
(0.88) (0.08) (0.18) (-0.18) (0.15)
Urban Lower -0.216*** -0.218*** -0.186*** -0.181*** -0.148**
(-4.47) (-4.51) (-4.07) (-3.82) (-3.27)
Urban Upper -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.239*** -0.197*** -0.167***
(-5.83) (-5.78) (-4.91) (-3.99) (-3.49)
Rural Lower -0.299*** -0.267*** -0.208*** -0.220*** -0.170***
(-7.08) (-6.17) (-5.09) (-5.17) (-4.19)
Rural Upper -0.256*** -0.218*** -0.137** -0.145** -0.0852
(-5.27) (-4.42) (-2.83) (-3.01) (-1.82)
Skill 1 0.121*** 0.0906***
(5.17) (3.79)
Skill 2 0.102*** 0.0923***
(3.66) (3.41)
Job Formality 0.0122 0.0900**
(0.41) (2.70)
Unionization 0.180*** 0.209***
(5.48) (6.58)
Full Time 0.247*** 0.152***
(8.21) (5.20)
Government Sector 0.00713 -0.0299
(0.16) (-0.71)
_cons 5.878*** 6.186*** 6.089*** 5.836*** 6.142*** 6.045***
(85.57) (77.15) (74.60) (69.71) (66.45) (64.91)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327
R2 0.087 0.186 0.213 0.258 0.265 0.301
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.4): OLS Analysis of Hourly Wages for Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.124 0.0984 0.0948 0.102 0.0879 0.0816
(1.95) (1.63) (1.61) (1.82) (1.54) (1.54)
Years of Schooling 0.0461*** -0.0386*** -0.0339*** -0.0268** -0.0341*** -0.0277**
(13.77) (-4.32) (-3.90) (-3.03) (-3.93) (-3.18)
Work Experience 0.0403*** 0.0349*** 0.0368*** 0.0313*** 0.0371*** 0.0314***
(6.36) (5.58) (5.94) (5.24) (6.00) (5.35)
Square Experience -0.00101*** -0.000901*** -0.000895*** -0.000754*** -0.000891*** -0.000705**
(-4.21) (-3.75) (-3.79) (-3.31) (-3.87) (-3.22)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00434*** 0.00367*** 0.00241*** 0.00373*** 0.00275***
(8.85) (7.95) (5.04) (7.96) (5.72)
Male 0.107*** 0.135*** 0.233*** 0.0703* 0.114***
(3.55) (4.72) (7.93) (2.14) (3.60)
Greater Cairo 0.0330 -0.00533 0.00259 -0.00160 0.00261
(0.72) (-0.12) (0.06) (-0.04) (0.06)
Urban Lower -0.127** -0.129** -0.133** -0.106* -0.0990*
(-2.93) (-3.01) (-3.23) (-2.47) (-2.40)
Urban Upper -0.197*** -0.189*** -0.208*** -0.151*** -0.150***
(-4.74) (-4.55) (-5.09) (-3.58) (-3.66)
Rural Lower -0.178*** -0.151*** -0.148*** -0.132*** -0.120***
(-5.04) (-4.14) (-4.23) (-3.58) (-3.38)
Rural Upper -0.119** -0.0853* -0.0924* -0.0570 -0.0505
(-2.92) (-2.04) (-2.24) (-1.35) (-1.24)
Skill 1 0.0960*** 0.0646**
(4.61) (2.97)
Skill 2 0.0938*** 0.0848***
(3.71) (3.43)
Job Formality 0.0513 0.101***
(1.90) (3.32)
Unionization 0.152*** 0.177***
(5.12) (5.99)
Full Time -0.254*** -0.328***
(-8.10) (-10.02)
Government Sector 0.0403 -0.0248
(1.04) (-0.66)
_cons 0.907*** 1.296*** 1.210*** 1.321*** 1.231*** 1.503***
(15.56) (18.75) (17.26) (17.86) (14.68) (17.92)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327
R2 0.107 0.158 0.184 0.240 0.212 0.280
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.5): OLS Analysis of Monthly Wages for Full Time Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.149 0.0833 0.0781 0.0724 0.0594 0.0558
(1.62) (1.00) (0.97) (0.94) (0.77) (0.75)
Years of Schooling 0.0441*** -0.0435*** -0.0343** -0.0273* -0.0336** -0.0253*
(10.01) (-3.91) (-3.12) (-2.49) (-3.01) (-2.23)
Work Experience 0.0494*** 0.0358*** 0.0361*** 0.0333*** 0.0381*** 0.0348***
(5.80) (4.32) (4.45) (4.23) (4.77) (4.52)
Square Experience -0.00124*** -0.000895** -0.000843** -0.000794** -0.000846** -0.000780**
(-3.94) (-2.84) (-2.74) (-2.64) (-2.88) (-2.74)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00458*** 0.00363*** 0.00255*** 0.00384*** 0.00272***
(7.31) (6.02) (4.17) (6.26) (4.29)
Male 0.333*** 0.376*** 0.395*** 0.242*** 0.252***
(7.38) (8.86) (9.42) (5.31) (5.67)
Greater Cairo 0.0126 -0.0309 -0.0328 -0.0315 -0.0286
(0.24) (-0.61) (-0.67) (-0.63) (-0.59)
Urban Lower -0.198*** -0.195*** -0.183*** -0.165** -0.145**
(-3.88) (-3.82) (-3.71) (-3.25) (-2.97)
Urban Upper -0.335*** -0.331*** -0.304*** -0.258*** -0.235***
(-5.94) (-5.86) (-5.51) (-4.57) (-4.28)
Rural Lower -0.289*** -0.262*** -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.199***
(-6.57) (-5.75) (-5.35) (-5.04) (-4.55)
Rural Upper -0.247*** -0.210*** -0.156** -0.165** -0.115*
(-4.53) (-3.83) (-2.92) (-3.10) (-2.24)
Skill 1 0.152*** 0.116***
(5.75) (4.18)
Skill 2 0.0995** 0.0877**
(3.09) (2.81)
Job Formality 0.0300 0.0863*
(0.94) (2.42)
Unionization 0.189*** 0.207***
(4.80) (5.40)
Government Sector 0.0163 -0.0251
(0.33) (-0.52)
_cons 6.000*** 6.325*** 6.232*** 6.120*** 6.246*** 6.228***
(77.54) (72.84) (69.90) (69.79) (62.01) (63.70)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577
R2 0.088 0.176 0.202 0.236 0.240 0.272
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.6): OLS Analysis of Hourly Wages for Full Time Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.163* 0.103 0.0957 0.0944 0.0867 0.0830
(2.14) (1.49) (1.44) (1.47) (1.36) (1.35)
Years of Schooling 0.0451*** -0.0467*** -0.0396*** -0.0348*** -0.0388*** -0.0316***
(11.42) (-4.86) (-4.24) (-3.71) (-4.20) (-3.33)
Work Experience 0.0329*** 0.0298*** 0.0302*** 0.0267*** 0.0308*** 0.0276***
(4.69) (4.22) (4.42) (4.04) (4.47) (4.17)
Square Experience -0.000790** -0.000733** -0.000687** -0.000629* -0.000691** -0.000625**
(-3.07) (-2.79) (-2.70) (-2.54) (-2.78) (-2.59)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00477*** 0.00395*** 0.00289*** 0.00391*** 0.00286***
(8.54) (7.56) (5.42) (7.50) (5.30)
Male 0.141*** 0.180*** 0.210*** 0.119** 0.130***
(3.73) (5.11) (6.12) (3.17) (3.55)
Greater Cairo 0.00385 -0.0361 -0.0374 -0.0327 -0.0310
(0.08) (-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.74) (-0.73)
Urban Lower -0.152*** -0.149*** -0.136** -0.125** -0.106*
(-3.52) (-3.44) (-3.25) (-2.89) (-2.54)
Urban Upper -0.258*** -0.250*** -0.231*** -0.203*** -0.184***
(-5.49) (-5.31) (-5.03) (-4.31) (-3.99)
Rural Lower -0.232*** -0.205*** -0.176*** -0.191*** -0.161***
(-6.20) (-5.33) (-4.78) (-4.91) (-4.28)
Rural Upper -0.179*** -0.141** -0.0933* -0.117** -0.0706
(-3.93) (-3.04) (-2.08) (-2.59) (-1.60)
Skill 1 0.129*** 0.0975***
(5.85) (4.16)
Skill 2 0.104*** 0.0939***
(3.96) (3.66)
Job Formality 0.0981*** 0.116***
(3.67) (3.78)
Unionization 0.168*** 0.175***
(5.02) (5.18)
Government Sector 0.0455 -0.00540
(1.07) (-0.13)
(3.96) (-1.42)
_cons 0.924*** 1.319*** 1.227*** 1.111*** 1.207*** 1.195***
(13.70) (17.92) (16.07) (14.88) (14.04) (14.52)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577
R2 0.112 0.187 0.217 0.264 0.254 0.292
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.7): OLS Analysis of Basic Wages for Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.235** 0.215** 0.214** 0.199** 0.157* 0.159*
(2.85) (2.96) (3.01) (2.87) (2.42) (2.45)
Years of Schooling 0.0235*** -0.0425*** -0.0326** -0.0281* -0.0328** -0.0285*
(5.51) (-3.66) (-2.83) (-2.54) (-2.92) (-2.55)
Work Experience 0.0677*** 0.0362*** 0.0384*** 0.0372*** 0.0416*** 0.0377***
(8.07) (4.58) (4.92) (4.86) (5.56) (5.12)
Square Experience -0.00180*** -0.000980** -0.000978** -0.000954** -0.000948*** -0.000872**
(-5.64) (-3.22) (-3.28) (-3.25) (-3.37) (-3.16)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00351*** 0.00262*** 0.00236*** 0.00343*** 0.00283***
(5.53) (4.21) (3.84) (5.64) (4.52)
Male 0.478*** 0.512*** 0.427*** 0.270*** 0.255***
(11.82) (13.43) (10.30) (6.40) (6.02)
Greater Cairo 0.106 0.0597 0.0589 0.0429 0.0559
(1.95) (1.18) (1.19) (0.87) (1.15)
Urban Lower -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.234*** -0.209*** -0.185***
(-5.19) (-5.28) (-4.90) (-4.33) (-3.90)
Urban Upper -0.365*** -0.364*** -0.308*** -0.244*** -0.220***
(-7.01) (-7.11) (-6.05) (-4.82) (-4.39)
Rural Lower -0.316*** -0.288*** -0.239*** -0.224*** -0.187***
(-7.35) (-6.58) (-5.55) (-5.17) (-4.36)
Rural Upper -0.283*** -0.251*** -0.173*** -0.153** -0.107*
(-5.59) (-4.94) (-3.35) (-3.07) (-2.16)
Skill 1 0.101*** 0.0633*
(3.95) (2.44)
Skill 2 0.0568 0.0503
(1.85) (1.70)
Job Formality -0.102*** 0.0119
(-3.30) (0.34)
Unionization 0.122** 0.152***
(3.28) (4.28)
Full Time 0.277*** 0.165***
(8.19) (5.00)
Government Sector -0.100* -0.105*
(-2.17) (-2.30)
_cons 6.987*** 7.263*** 7.174*** 6.942*** 7.306*** 7.186***
(92.61) (86.79) (85.13) (78.62) (77.35) (73.81)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327
R2 0.057 0.187 0.214 0.248 0.281 0.298
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.8): OLS Analysis of Basic Wages for Full Time Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.249* 0.183* 0.185* 0.174* 0.147 0.146
(2.57) (2.13) (2.19) (2.17) (1.90) (1.93)
Years of Schooling 0.0321*** -0.0565*** -0.0438*** -0.0352** -0.0392** -0.0317*
(6.32) (-4.62) (-3.62) (-2.93) (-3.23) (-2.57)
Work Experience 0.0515*** 0.0316*** 0.0319*** 0.0312*** 0.0347*** 0.0326***
(5.47) (3.47) (3.59) (3.55) (4.01) (3.84)
Square Experience -0.00137*** -0.000862* -0.000813* -0.000795* -0.000785* -0.000745*
(-3.86) (-2.51) (-2.43) (-2.40) (-2.48) (-2.40)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00465*** 0.00354*** 0.00272*** 0.00376*** 0.00288***
(6.80) (5.35) (4.00) (5.64) (4.11)
Male 0.455*** 0.503*** 0.502*** 0.313*** 0.323***
(8.03) (9.65) (9.44) (5.66) (5.88)
Greater Cairo 0.0712 0.0222 0.0211 0.0154 0.0214
(1.22) (0.41) (0.40) (0.29) (0.41)
Urban Lower -0.214*** -0.212*** -0.209*** -0.171*** -0.159**
(-4.03) (-4.05) (-4.00) (-3.30) (-3.08)
Urban Upper -0.384*** -0.383*** -0.357*** -0.286*** -0.270***
(-6.52) (-6.60) (-6.19) (-4.96) (-4.74)
Rural Lower -0.292*** -0.267*** -0.246*** -0.223*** -0.200***
(-6.41) (-5.75) (-5.36) (-4.73) (-4.29)
Rural Upper -0.250*** -0.218*** -0.174** -0.152** -0.117*
(-4.37) (-3.85) (-3.03) (-2.76) (-2.13)
Skill 1 0.123*** 0.0789**
(4.28) (2.64)
Skill 2 0.0824* 0.0729*
(2.35) (2.15)
Job Formality -0.0829* 0.00692
(-2.50) (0.19)
Unionization 0.157*** 0.176***
(3.57) (4.13)
Government Sector -0.102 -0.117*
(-1.92) (-2.23)
_cons 7.098*** 7.360*** 7.269*** 7.201*** 7.347*** 7.329***
(81.75) (80.00) (77.92) (77.01) (70.59) (71.22)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577
R2 0.055 0.168 0.199 0.217 0.246 0.260
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.9): OLS Analysis of Non-Basic Wages for Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion -0.770** -0.922*** -0.929*** -0.812*** -0.695** -0.706**
(-3.29) (-4.09) (-4.10) (-3.64) (-3.10) (-3.22)
Years of Schooling 0.166*** 0.146** 0.114* 0.102* 0.0999* 0.105*
(10.41) (2.95) (2.28) (2.15) (2.00) (2.18)
Work Experience -0.0269 0.0384 0.0400 0.00150 0.0329 0.00499
(-0.80) (1.11) (1.18) (0.05) (0.99) (0.15)
Square Experience 0.00176 0.000105 0.0000555 0.000807 -0.000244 0.000480
(1.38) (0.08) (0.04) (0.68) (-0.20) (0.41)
Square Years of Schooling 0.000591 0.00165 -0.00292 -0.000816 -0.00404
(0.21) (0.57) (-1.04) (-0.28) (-1.39)
Male -0.994*** -1.024*** -0.597** -0.358 -0.337
(-4.98) (-5.26) (-2.83) (-1.59) (-1.48)
Greater Cairo -0.932*** -0.880*** -0.837*** -0.808** -0.815***
(-3.62) (-3.48) (-3.46) (-3.20) (-3.38)
Urban Lower -0.153 -0.187 -0.0976 -0.305 -0.187
(-0.59) (-0.73) (-0.40) (-1.21) (-0.77)
Urban Upper 0.431 0.451 0.386 0.119 0.213
(1.62) (1.69) (1.49) (0.46) (0.83)
Rural Lower -0.284 -0.283 -0.186 -0.453* -0.297
(-1.29) (-1.26) (-0.87) (-2.05) (-1.40)
Rural Upper -0.0126 0.0206 0.0340 -0.230 -0.0567
(-0.05) (0.08) (0.14) (-0.94) (-0.24)
Skill 1 0.377** 0.461***
(3.28) (3.80)
Skill 2 0.222 0.177
(1.56) (1.24)
Job Formality 1.427*** 1.165***
(12.47) (8.29)
Unionization 0.581*** 0.579***
(3.42) (3.48)
Full Time -0.502** -0.287
(-3.19) (-1.79)
Government Sector 0.999*** 0.568*
(4.46) (2.50)
_cons -0.0808 0.645 0.617 0.441 -0.381 -0.0125
(-0.27) (1.84) (1.74) (1.23) (-0.99) (-0.03)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327
R2 0.048 0.080 0.095 0.162 0.146 0.184
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
48
Table (5.2.10): OLS Analysis of Non-Basic Wages for Full Time Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion -0.901*** -0.933*** -0.986*** -0.923*** -0.816*** -0.831***
(-3.74) (-4.01) (-4.15) (-3.87) (-3.43) (-3.54)
Years of Schooling 0.134*** 0.165** 0.121* 0.0985* 0.0865 0.0907
(7.34) (3.27) (2.40) (2.00) (1.67) (1.79)
Work Experience -0.0462 -0.00125 -0.00314 -0.0279 -0.00659 -0.0221
(-1.18) (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.75) (-0.18) (-0.61)
Square Experience 0.00229 0.00121 0.00133 0.00170 0.000954 0.00130
(1.57) (0.87) (0.97) (1.30) (0.72) (1.00)
Square Years of Schooling -0.00180 -0.0000135 -0.00237 -0.000156 -0.00253
(-0.63) (-0.00) (-0.79) (-0.05) (-0.81)
Male -0.960*** -1.024*** -0.816** -0.595* -0.622*
(-3.46) (-3.81) (-3.00) (-1.98) (-2.08)
Greater Cairo -0.856** -0.809** -0.824** -0.754** -0.795**
(-3.10) (-2.99) (-3.20) (-2.80) (-3.08)
Urban Lower -0.219 -0.221 -0.115 -0.299 -0.185
(-0.77) (-0.78) (-0.42) (-1.07) (-0.69)
Urban Upper 0.232 0.255 0.276 0.0472 0.147
(0.78) (0.86) (0.95) (0.16) (0.51)
Rural Lower -0.332 -0.301 -0.190 -0.406 -0.273
(-1.39) (-1.23) (-0.81) (-1.67) (-1.16)
Rural Upper -0.237 -0.161 -0.0560 -0.307 -0.113
(-0.90) (-0.60) (-0.22) (-1.14) (-0.44)
Skill 1 0.375** 0.456***
(2.93) (3.33)
Skill 2 0.0518 0.00000748
(0.32) (0.00)
Job Formality 1.362*** 1.138***
(11.00) (7.66)
Unionization 0.331 0.374
(1.67) (1.92)
Government Sector 1.014*** 0.644*
(4.07) (2.52)
_cons 0.231 0.954* 0.943* 0.424 0.198 0.223
(0.67) (2.43) (2.43) (1.12) (0.46) (0.54)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577
R2 0.036 0.059 0.078 0.133 0.121 0.156
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.11): OLS Analysis of Total Quarterly Wages for Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.148 0.121 0.118 0.112 0.0839 0.0842
(1.91) (1.73) (1.72) (1.67) (1.30) (1.32)
Years of Schooling 0.0373*** -0.0298** -0.0222* -0.0183 -0.0248* -0.0193*
(10.11) (-2.93) (-2.24) (-1.89) (-2.54) (-1.96)
Work Experience 0.0665*** 0.0424*** 0.0450*** 0.0404*** 0.0471*** 0.0407***
(8.47) (5.75) (6.17) (5.82) (6.74) (6.10)
Square Experience -0.00170*** -0.00107*** -0.00108*** -0.000987*** -0.00107*** -0.000930***
(-5.84) (-3.79) (-3.89) (-3.69) (-4.11) (-3.70)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00353*** 0.00270*** 0.00198*** 0.00336*** 0.00240***
(6.37) (5.13) (3.77) (6.46) (4.49)
Male 0.374*** 0.406*** 0.357*** 0.224*** 0.213***
(11.11) (12.63) (10.89) (6.28) (6.16)
Greater Cairo 0.0450 0.00396 0.00841 -0.00829 0.00674
(0.88) (0.08) (0.18) (-0.18) (0.15)
Urban Lower -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.186*** -0.181*** -0.148**
(-4.47) (-4.51) (-4.07) (-3.82) (-3.27)
Urban Upper -0.292*** -0.288*** -0.239*** -0.197*** -0.167***
(-5.82) (-5.78) (-4.91) (-3.99) (-3.49)
Rural Lower -0.299*** -0.267*** -0.208*** -0.220*** -0.170***
(-7.08) (-6.17) (-5.09) (-5.17) (-4.19)
Rural Upper -0.256*** -0.218*** -0.137** -0.145** -0.0852
(-5.27) (-4.41) (-2.83) (-3.01) (-1.82)
Skill 1 0.121*** 0.0907***
(5.17) (3.79)
Skill 2 0.102*** 0.0924***
(3.66) (3.41)
Job Formality 0.0122 0.0901**
(0.41) (2.70)
Unionization 0.180*** 0.209***
(5.48) (6.58)
Full Time 0.247*** 0.152***
(8.21) (5.20)
Government Sector 0.00725 -0.0298
(0.16) (-0.71)
_cons 6.975*** 7.283*** 7.186*** 6.933*** 7.239*** 7.142***
(101.43) (90.72) (87.93) (82.71) (78.24) (76.61)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327 3327
R2 0.087 0.186 0.213 0.258 0.265 0.301
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.12): OLS Analysis of Total Quarterly Wages for Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religion 0.149 0.0833 0.0781 0.0724 0.0594 0.0558
(1.62) (1.00) (0.97) (0.94) (0.77) (0.75)
Years of Schooling 0.0441*** -0.0435*** -0.0343** -0.0273* -0.0336** -0.0253*
(10.01) (-3.91) (-3.12) (-2.49) (-3.01) (-2.23)
Work Experience 0.0494*** 0.0359*** 0.0361*** 0.0334*** 0.0382*** 0.0349***
(5.80) (4.32) (4.46) (4.23) (4.77) (4.53)
Square Experience -0.00124*** -0.000896** -0.000844** -0.000795** -0.000847** -0.000781**
(-3.94) (-2.85) (-2.74) (-2.64) (-2.88) (-2.74)
Square Years of Schooling 0.00458*** 0.00364*** 0.00255*** 0.00384*** 0.00273***
(7.31) (6.02) (4.17) (6.26) (4.29)
Male 0.333*** 0.377*** 0.395*** 0.242*** 0.252***
(7.39) (8.86) (9.42) (5.31) (5.67)
Greater Cairo 0.0126 -0.0309 -0.0329 -0.0315 -0.0287
(0.24) (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.59)
Urban Lower -0.198*** -0.195*** -0.183*** -0.165** -0.146**
(-3.88) (-3.82) (-3.71) (-3.25) (-2.97)
Urban Upper -0.336*** -0.331*** -0.305*** -0.258*** -0.235***
(-5.94) (-5.87) (-5.51) (-4.57) (-4.28)
Rural Lower -0.289*** -0.262*** -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.199***
(-6.57) (-5.75) (-5.35) (-5.04) (-4.55)
Rural Upper -0.247*** -0.210*** -0.156** -0.165** -0.115*
(-4.53) (-3.83) (-2.92) (-3.11) (-2.24)
(0.47) (0.49) (0.34) (0.43)
Skill 1 0.152*** 0.116***
(5.75) (4.18)
Skill 2 0.0995** 0.0877**
(3.09) (2.81)
Job Formality 0.0301 0.0864*
(0.95) (2.42)
Unionization 0.189*** 0.207***
(4.80) (5.40)
Government Sector 0.0164 -0.0251
(0.33) (-0.52)
_cons 7.097*** 7.422*** 7.329*** 7.217*** 7.343*** 7.325***
(91.64) (85.39) (82.13) (82.23) (72.84) (74.86)
Father’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes
N 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577 2577
R2 0.088 0.176 0.202 0.236 0.240 0.272
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.13): The ATT using Matching 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Nearest Neighbor
Monthly 0.183* 0.120 0.170
(2.31) (1.40) (1.82)
Hourly 0.0690 0.0457 0.203*
(1.02) (0.54) (2.47)
Basic 0.192* 0.255*
(2.09) (2.52)
Non-Basic -0.356 -0.398
(-0.91) (-0.95)
Total 0.120 0.170
(1.40) (1.82)
N 4521 3327 2577
Kernel
Monthly 0.0985** 0.0831 0.0924
(2.71) (1.55) (1.66)
Hourly 0.0843* 0.0801 0.113*
(1.96) (1.60) (2.06)
Basic Wages 0.147** 0.177**
(2.71) (2.99)
Non-Basic Wages -0.521* -0.756**
(-2.20) (-3.26)
Total Quarterly Wages 0.0832
(1.21)
0.0925
(1.36)
             
N0 4350 3194 2477
N1 233 173 128
Stratification
Monthly 0.0469 0.0295 0.00233
(0.92) (0.47) (0.04)
Hourly 0.0336 0.0207 0.0346
(1.16) (0.43) (0.70)
Basic Wages 0.0993 0.0910
(1.62) (1.34)
Non-Basic Wages -0.593* -0.829**
(-2.51) (-3.24)
Total Quarterly Wages 0.0295
(0.63)
0.00234
(0.04)
N0 4295 3159 2451
N1 228 170 128
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.14): Simple Threefold Decomposition – Monthly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 6.760*** 6.799*** 6.867***
(517.07) (474.22) (425.08)
Christians 6.920*** 6.972*** 7.065***
(105.07) (86.50) (75.67)
Difference -0.160* -0.173* -0.199*
(-2.39) (-2.11) (-2.10)
Endowments -0.0201 -0.0451 -0.105
(-0.32) (-0.61) (-1.26)
Coefficients -0.110 -0.117 -0.105
(-1.92) (-1.79) (-1.36)
Interaction -0.0297 -0.0107 0.0116
(-0.58) (-0.19) (0.19)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.15): Extended Threefold Decomposition – Monthly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 6.760*** 6.799*** 6.867***
(517.70) (471.62) (424.88)
Christians 6.920*** 6.972*** 7.065***
(106.94) (88.87) (74.48)
Difference -0.160* -0.173* -0.199*
(-2.43) (-2.17) (-2.06)
Endowments -0.110 -0.103 -0.155
(-1.34) (-1.03) (-1.47)
Coefficients -0.0756 -0.0882 -0.0671
(-1.38) (-1.43) (-0.88)
Interaction 0.0257 0.0178 0.0233
(0.35) (0.21) (0.27)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.16): Simple Threefold Decomposition – Hourly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 1.744*** 1.740*** 1.684***
(167.00) (135.20) (118.74)
Christians 1.879*** 1.901*** 1.899***
(36.30) (28.96) (24.11)
Difference -0.135* -0.161* -0.215**
(-2.56) (-2.40) (-2.69)
Endowments -0.00836 -0.0222 -0.0694
(-0.17) (-0.37) (-0.99)
Coefficients -0.0844 -0.111* -0.132*
(-1.84) (-1.98) (-2.00)
Interaction -0.0426 -0.0276 -0.0131
(-1.05) (-0.57) (-0.25)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.17): Extended Threefold Decomposition – Hourly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 1.744*** 1.740*** 1.684***
(165.87) (134.43) (118.41)
Christians 1.879*** 1.901*** 1.899***
(36.00) (29.39) (23.92)
Difference -0.135* -0.161* -0.215**
(-2.54) (-2.43) (-2.67)
Endowments -0.0660 -0.0608 -0.115
(-0.98) (-0.74) (-1.29)
Coefficients -0.0689 -0.0835 -0.0908
(-1.54) (-1.59) (-1.42)
Interaction -0.000462 -0.0162 -0.00942
(-0.01) (-0.23) (-0.13)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.18): Simple Threefold Decomposition – Detailed All Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.744*** 1.841*** 7.897***
(494.02) (27.97) (550.31)
Christians 7.990*** 1.230*** 8.070***
(94.37) (5.37) (100.05)
Difference -0.246** 0.611* -0.173*
(-2.86) (2.56) (-2.11)
Endowments -0.102 0.660 -0.0451
(-1.09) (1.84) (-0.60)
Coefficients -0.194** 0.751*** -0.117
(-2.88) (3.37) (-1.79)
Interaction 0.0499 -0.800* -0.0107
(0.65) (-2.29) (-0.19)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.19): Extended Threefold Decomposition – Detailed All Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
overall
Muslims 7.744*** 1.841*** 7.897***
(495.81) (28.42) (547.29)
Christians 7.990*** 1.230*** 8.070***
(95.94) (5.54) (102.80)
Difference -0.246** 0.611** -0.173*
(-2.91) (2.64) (-2.17)
Endowments -0.177 0.865* -0.103
(-1.56) (2.29) (-1.03)
Coefficients -0.163** 0.724*** -0.0882
(-2.60) (3.40) (-1.43)
Interaction 0.0939 -0.978** 0.0177
(0.96) (-2.66) (0.21)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.20): Simple Threefold Decomposition – Detailed All Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.832*** 1.587*** 7.965***
(448.97) (21.96) (492.69)
Christians 8.116*** 0.854*** 8.163***
(84.12) (3.78) (87.37)
Difference -0.284** 0.733** -0.199*
(-2.90) (3.09) (-2.10)
Endowments -0.162 0.688* -0.105
(-1.59) (2.01) (-1.26)
Coefficients -0.196* 0.859*** -0.105
(-2.46) (3.70) (-1.36)
Interaction 0.0733 -0.815* 0.0116
(0.88) (-2.40) (0.19)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.21): Extended Threefold Decomposition – Detailed All Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.832*** 1.587*** 7.965***
(453.90) (22.43) (492.44)
Christians 8.116*** 0.854*** 8.163***
(82.40) (3.90) (86.00)
Difference -0.284** 0.733** -0.199*
(-2.84) (3.19) (-2.06)
Endowments -0.241 0.817* -0.155
(-1.94) (2.46) (-1.47)
Coefficients -0.159* 0.854*** -0.0671
(-2.04) (3.75) (-0.88)
Interaction 0.115 -0.938** 0.0233
(1.08) (-2.84) (0.27)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.22): Simple Twofold Decomposition – Monthly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 6.760*** 6.799*** 6.867***
(517.07) (474.22) (425.08)
Christians 6.920*** 6.972*** 7.065***
(105.07) (86.50) (75.67)
Difference -0.160* -0.173* -0.199*
(-2.39) (-2.11) (-2.10)
Explained -0.0473 -0.0542 -0.0921*
(-1.63) (-1.33) (-2.32)
Unexplained -0.113* -0.119 -0.107
(-1.96) (-1.80) (-1.39)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.23): Extended Twofold Decomposition – Monthly  Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 6.760*** 6.799*** 6.867***
(517.70) (471.62) (424.88)
Christians 6.920*** 6.972*** 7.065***
(106.94) (88.87) (74.48)
Difference -0.160* -0.173* -0.199*
(-2.43) (-2.17) (-2.06)
Explained -0.0867* -0.0889 -0.143**
(-2.36) (-1.88) (-3.04)
Unexplained -0.0736 -0.0842 -0.0558
(-1.39) (-1.42) (-0.78)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.24): Simple Twofold Decomposition – Hourly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 1.744*** 1.740*** 1.684***
(167.00) (135.20) (118.74)
Christians 1.879*** 1.901*** 1.899***
(36.30) (28.96) (24.11)
Difference -0.135* -0.161* -0.215**
(-2.56) (-2.40) (-2.69)
Explained -0.0481* -0.0472 -0.0803*
(-2.42) (-1.65) (-2.39)
Unexplained -0.0874 -0.113* -0.135*
(-1.91) (-2.03) (-2.05)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.25): Extended Twofold Decomposition – Hourly Wages 
(1) (2) (3)
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Muslims 1.744*** 1.740*** 1.684***
(165.87) (134.43) (118.41)
Christians 1.879*** 1.901*** 1.899***
(36.00) (29.39) (23.92)
Difference -0.135* -0.161* -0.215**
(-2.54) (-2.43) (-2.67)
Explained -0.0683** -0.0790* -0.132***
(-2.66) (-2.33) (-3.30)
Unexplained -0.0672 -0.0816 -0.0830
(-1.57) (-1.63) (-1.39)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.26): Simple Twofold Decomposition – Detailed All Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.744*** 1.841*** 7.897***
(494.02) (27.97) (550.31)
Christians 7.990*** 1.230*** 8.070***
(94.37) (5.37) (100.05)
Difference -0.246** 0.611* -0.173*
(-2.86) (2.56) (-2.11)
Explained -0.0507 -0.129 -0.0543
(-1.13) (-1.09) (-1.33)
Unexplained -0.196** 0.740*** -0.119
(-2.88) (3.32) (-1.80)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.27): Extended Twofold Decomposition – Detailed All Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.744*** 1.841*** 7.897***
(495.81) (28.42) (547.29)
Christians 7.990*** 1.230*** 8.070***
(95.94) (5.54) (102.80)
Difference -0.246** 0.611** -0.173*
(-2.91) (2.64) (-2.17)
Explained -0.0878 -0.0953 -0.0890
(-1.67) (-0.74) (-1.88)
Unexplained -0.159** 0.706*** -0.0842
(-2.61) (3.32) (-1.42)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.2.28): Simple Twofold Decomposition – Detailed All Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.832*** 1.587*** 7.965***
(448.97) (21.96) (492.69)
Christians 8.116*** 0.854*** 8.163***
(84.12) (3.78) (87.37)
Difference -0.284** 0.733** -0.199*
(-2.90) (3.09) (-2.10)
Explained -0.0888* -0.107 -0.0922*
(-2.11) (-0.88) (-2.32)
Unexplained -0.196* 0.840*** -0.107
(-2.47) (3.63) (-1.39)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table (5.2.29): Extended Twofold Decomposition – Detailed All Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Wages Non-Basic Wages Total Wages
Muslims 7.832*** 1.587*** 7.965***
(453.90) (22.43) (492.44)
Christians 8.116*** 0.854*** 8.163***
(82.40) (3.90) (86.00)
Difference -0.284** 0.733** -0.199*
(-2.84) (3.19) (-2.06)
Explained -0.139** -0.0987 -0.143**
(-2.75) (-0.73) (-3.04)
Unexplained -0.146* 0.831*** -0.0558
(-1.99) (3.69) (-0.78)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (5.3.1): Average Basic and Total Quarterly Wages According to Non-Basic Wage 
Payment Status
Average Basic Wages for Zero Non-Basic Wage Sector L.E. 3269
Average Basic Wages for Positive Non-Basic Wage Sector L.E. 2269
Average Positive Non-Basic Wage L. E. 1468
Average Total Quarterly Wages for Zero Non-Basic Wage Sector L.E. 3269
Average Total Quarterly Wages for Positive Non-Basic Wage 
Sector
L.E. 3738
Table (5.3.2): Probit Models for Receiving Non-Basic Wages in Private, Government, and 
All Sectors.
Pooled Government Sector Private Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Christian -0.141*** -0.0986 -0.162* -0.135 -0.0920* -0.0649
(-3.50) (-1.91) (-2.17) (-1.90) (-2.19) (-1.58)
Male -0.152*** -0.0375 -0.117** -0.0695 -0.0411 -0.0223
(-6.44) (-1.43) (-3.16) (-1.69) (-1.08) (-0.54)
Years of Schooling 0.0219*** 0.00806** 0.0138* -0.00191 0.0120*** 0.00893**
(7.95) (2.62) (2.40) (-0.25) (4.05) (3.06)
Experience 0.00481** 0.00253 0.00543 0.00680* 0.000128 0.000565
(2.78) (1.58) (1.70) (2.24) (0.07) (0.33)
Government Sector 0.131***
(4.49)
Interaction: Christian 
* Government Sector
-0.00725
(-0.10)
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
N 3325 3324 1385 1380 1937 1936
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (6.1.1): OLS Analysis for Total Non-Pecuniary Benefits 
All Wage Earners Regular Wage Earners Full Time Regular Wage Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Christian -0.134 -0.0168 -0.338* -0.0404 -0.278 -0.0615
(-1.10) (-0.20) (-2.35) (-0.38) (-1.69) (-0.47)
Years of Schooling 0.191*** 0.0178*** 0.184*** 0.0258*** 0.179*** 0.0287***
(30.75) (4.78) (23.27) (4.49) (19.61) (4.80)
Experience 0.0743*** 0.0333*** 0.105*** 0.0497*** 0.0965*** 0.0456***
(4.68) (3.82) (5.71) (4.58) (4.37) (3.88)
Experience Squared -0.00136* -0.000909** -0.00213** -0.00134*** -0.00179* -0.00121**
(-2.42) (-3.16) (-3.10) (-3.53) (-2.21) (-2.96)
Male -1.114*** -0.0919 -0.882*** -0.0820 -0.924*** -0.0692
(-15.99) (-1.87) (-13.19) (-1.46) (-10.60) (-0.98)
Greater Cairo -0.0751 -0.0496 -0.0728 -0.0898 -0.0799 -0.132
(-0.63) (-0.76) (-0.61) (-1.23) (-0.60) (-1.66)
Urban Lower -0.412*** -0.267*** -0.414*** -0.340*** -0.502*** -0.403***
(-3.44) (-3.98) (-3.33) (-4.45) (-3.60) (-4.70)
Urban Upper -0.297** -0.150** 0.0546 -0.245*** -0.0538 -0.298***
(-2.58) (-2.66) (0.45) (-3.67) (-0.38) (-3.76)
Rural Lower -0.306** -0.0946 -0.211* -0.158** -0.251* -0.191**
(-2.96) (-1.84) (-1.99) (-2.73) (-2.09) (-2.90)
Rural Upper -0.466*** -0.0177 0.0927 -0.0824 0.0317 -0.0897
(-4.31) (-0.34) (0.77) (-1.29) (0.23) (-1.26)
Skill Level 1 -0.0248 -0.0194 0.0163
(-0.83) (-0.51) (0.38)
Skill level 2 0.165*** 0.142*** 0.169***
(4.49) (3.38) (3.46)
Formal Sector 2.467*** 2.604*** 2.621***
(42.29) (42.34) (41.05)
Unionization 0.181*** 0.224*** 0.146**
(4.08) (4.78) (2.68)
Full Time 0.0493 0.0557 .
(1.07) (1.14) .
Government 0.567*** 0.587*** 0.634***
(8.27) (7.89) (7.81)
_cons 0.367* -0.00742 0.248 -0.329** 0.375 -0.256*
(2.18) (-0.07) (1.32) (-2.64) (1.70) (-1.99)
Parental Background Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes Yes
N 4523 4523 3329 3329 2579 2579
R2 0.300 0.844 0.235 0.778 0.206 0.788
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (6.1.2): Probit Models of Non-Pecuniary Benefits for All Wage Earners
Social Insurance Sick Leave Paid Leaves (Vacations) Medical Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Christian -0.0504 -0.00505 -0.0508 -0.0106 -0.0544 -0.00536 -0.0513 -0.00151
(-1.36) (-0.19) (-1.48) (-0.30) (-1.48) (-0.20) (-1.39) (-0.05)
Years of Schooling 0.0462*** 0.000219 0.0502*** 0.00902*** 0.0512*** 0.00637*** 0.0503*** 0.00543***
(24.15) (0.10) (25.85) (4.07) (27.12) (4.59) (26.17) (3.45)
Experience 0.0104*** 0.00502*** 0.00963*** 0.00216 0.00969*** 0.00168* 0.0115*** 0.00276**
(7.22) (4.43) (6.86) (1.80) (6.93) (2.01) (8.39) (2.88)
Male -0.226*** -0.0341* -0.271*** -0.0107 -0.277*** -0.0200 -0.269*** -0.0329
(-10.52) (-2.20) (-13.03) (-0.46) (-13.26) (-1.24) (-12.70) (-1.92)
Greater Cairo -0.0303 -0.0267 0.0375 0.0452 -0.00507 0.00132 -0.0920** -0.0561***
(-0.86) (-0.98) (1.16) (1.84) (-0.16) (0.08) (-2.87) (-3.31)
Urban Lower -0.122*** -0.0834** -0.0884** -0.0693** -0.0946** -0.0524** -0.122*** -0.0636***
(-3.68) (-3.29) (-2.86) (-3.01) (-3.08) (-3.23) (-3.87) (-3.49)
Urban Upper -0.120*** -0.0671** -0.0365 -0.0187 -0.0551 -0.0240 -0.0866** -0.0383*
(-3.85) (-2.72) (-1.20) (-0.82) (-1.79) (-1.45) (-2.77) (-2.26)
Rural Lower -0.103*** -0.0344 -0.0457 -0.0210 -0.0610* -0.0220 -0.0856** -0.0320*
(-3.67) (-1.45) (-1.75) (-1.08) (-2.34) (-1.71) (-3.18) (-2.11)
Rural Upper -0.183*** -0.0333 -0.0890** 0.00575 -0.104*** 0.00522 -0.135*** -0.0146
(-6.20) (-1.30) (-3.20) (0.24) (-3.75) (0.35) (-4.71) (-0.73)
Skill Level 1 0.0327** -0.00859 -0.0118 0.00456
(2.94) (-0.65) (-1.27) (0.48)
Skill Level 2 0.0145 0.0265 0.0328*** 0.0200
(1.15) (1.95) (3.50) (1.89)
Formality . 0.286*** 0.228*** 0.270***
. (21.32) (25.34) (24.12)
Unionization 0.0488*** 0.0489** 0.0273** 0.0559***
(3.55) (3.06) (2.64) (4.62)
Full Time 0.0350** 0.0189 -0.00517 0.00474
(2.61) (0.90) (-0.34) (0.31)
Government 0.00873 0.143*** 0.0937*** 0.0925***
(0.44) (6.33) (6.03) (6.28)
Parental 
Background
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Stability Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4523 2316 4523 3270 4523 4514 4523 4473
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (6.1.3): Probit Models of Non-Pecuniary Benefits for Regular Wage Earners
Social Insurance Sick Leave Paid Leaves (Vacations) Medical Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Christian -0.0860* -0.0105 -0.0888* -0.0161 -0.105* -0.0275 -0.0875* -0.00967
(-2.02) (-0.40) (-2.20) (-0.47) (-2.54) (-0.91) (-2.11) (-0.27)
Years of Schooling 0.0403*** 0.000477 0.0460*** 0.00880*** 0.0470*** 0.00884*** 0.0470*** 0.00721***
(17.73) (0.21) (20.81) (3.97) (21.92) (4.67) (20.94) (3.49)
Experience 0.0133*** 0.00635*** 0.0121*** 0.00296* 0.0122*** 0.00328** 0.0147*** 0.00477***
(8.07) (5.31) (7.44) (2.49) (7.55) (2.91) (9.14) (3.88)
Male -0.190*** -0.0238 -0.240*** -0.00174 -0.243*** -0.0172 -0.243*** -0.0348
(-8.32) (-1.46) (-10.62) (-0.08) (-10.71) (-0.83) (-10.18) (-1.54)
Greater Cairo -0.0250 -0.0319 0.0481 0.0431 -0.00137 -0.000385 -0.105** -0.0850***
(-0.67) (-1.12) (1.38) (1.71) (-0.04) (-0.02) (-2.97) (-3.60)
Urban Lower -0.120*** -0.0924*** -0.0936** -0.0741** -0.101** -0.0749*** -0.140*** -0.100***
(-3.41) (-3.41) (-2.80) (-3.18) (-3.06) (-3.48) (-4.01) (-4.12)
Urban Upper -0.0384 -0.0883*** 0.0551 -0.0329 0.0330 -0.0511* -0.00813 -0.0681**
(-1.08) (-3.45) (1.52) (-1.43) (0.90) (-2.39) (-0.22) (-2.96)
Rural Lower -0.0824** -0.0420 -0.0305 -0.0296 -0.0474 -0.0376* -0.0807** -0.0553**
(-2.74) (-1.70) (-1.07) (-1.48) (-1.68) (-2.10) (-2.69) (-2.61)
Rural Upper -0.0459 -0.0473 0.0512 -0.00761 0.0367 -0.0115 -0.00681 -0.0392
(-1.32) (-1.81) (1.57) (-0.31) (1.11) (-0.56) (-0.19) (-1.45)
Skill Level 1 0.0313** -0.00604 -0.0138 0.00418
(2.67) (-0.46) (-1.13) (0.33)
Skill Level 2 0.0193 0.0300* 0.0414*** 0.0262*
(1.45) (2.19) (3.32) (1.97)
Formality . 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.377***
. (22.48) (27.56) (22.64)
Unionization 0.0624*** 0.0557*** 0.0440** 0.0793***
(4.32) (3.52) (3.20) (4.97)
Full Time 0.0432** 0.0182 -0.00658 0.0149
(3.05) (0.86) (-0.32) (0.74)
Government 0.0225 0.154*** 0.130*** 0.130***
(1.00) (6.73) (5.67) (6.14)
Parental 
Background
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3329 2271 3329 3270 3329 3318 3329 3293
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (6.1.4): Probit Models of Non-Pecuniary Benefits for Full Time Regular Wage 
Earners
Social Insurance Sick Leave Paid Leaves (Vacations) Medical Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Christian -0.0555 0.00338 -0.0599 -0.0164 -0.0896 -0.0377 -0.0947 -0.0452
(-1.12) (0.10) (-1.30) (-0.39) (-1.88) (-1.01) (-1.93) (-1.33)
Years of Schooling 0.0384*** -0.000809 0.0467*** 0.0112*** 0.0479*** 0.0105*** 0.0461*** 0.00721***
(14.26) (-0.34) (18.36) (4.47) (19.43) (4.80) (17.67) (3.34)
Experience 0.0118*** 0.00425*** 0.0127*** 0.00340* 0.0135*** 0.00438*** 0.0135*** 0.00327**
(6.12) (3.52) (6.83) (2.52) (7.30) (3.39) (7.30) (2.63)
Male -0.209*** -0.0116 -0.251*** 0.0155 -0.255*** -0.0175 -0.272*** -0.0281
(-6.67) (-0.56) (-8.12) (0.51) (-8.16) (-0.64) (-8.78) (-1.01)
Greater Cairo -0.0254 -0.0459 0.0379 0.0283 -0.0171 -0.0163 -0.0941* -0.0789**
(-0.61) (-1.59) (0.98) (1.05) (-0.45) (-0.67) (-2.42) (-3.04)
Urban Lower -0.128** -0.104*** -0.115** -0.0851** -0.128*** -0.0884*** -0.162*** -0.119***
(-3.29) (-3.67) (-3.06) (-3.28) (-3.42) (-3.64) (-4.18) (-4.57)
Urban Upper -0.0446 -0.0922*** 0.0139 -0.0492 -0.00827 -0.0602* -0.0451 -0.0827**
(-1.08) (-3.48) (0.34) (-1.83) (-0.20) (-2.46) (-1.09) (-3.16)
Rural Lower -0.0934** -0.0663** -0.0365 -0.0293 -0.0648* -0.0439* -0.0838* -0.0554*
(-2.80) (-2.70) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-2.02) (-2.14) (-2.49) (-2.32)
Rural Upper -0.0498 -0.0348 0.0396 -0.00610 0.0204 -0.00163 -0.0225 -0.0480
(-1.26) (-1.31) (1.04) (-0.21) (0.53) (-0.07) (-0.55) (-1.62)
Skill Level 1 0.0302* 0.00212 -0.00549 0.0166
(2.42) (0.14) (-0.40) (1.17)
Skill Level 2 0.0276 0.0298 0.0500** 0.0306*
(1.84) (1.80) (3.27) (2.02)
Formality . 0.317*** 0.336*** 0.387***
. (22.21) (27.73) (21.49)
Unionization 0.0398* 0.0438* 0.0316 0.0536**
(2.50) (2.28) (1.95) (3.07)
Government 0.00246 0.174*** 0.137*** 0.153***
(0.11) (6.26) (4.79) (6.34)
Parental 
Background
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Activity Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2579 1653 2579 2537 2579 2572 2579 2540
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (6.2.1): Levels of Satisfaction with Working Conditions and Job Properties
Muslims Christians Total
% % %
Overall
Fully Dissatisfied 8.4 4.9 8.2
Rather Dissatisfied 8.7 5.8 8.5
Neutral 12.2 6.2 11.8
Rather Satisfied 27.9 25.0 27.8
Fully Satisfied 42.9 58.1 43.7
Job Security
Fully Dissatisfied 12.1 8.5 11.9
Rather Dissatisfied 10.9 6.7 10.7
Neutral 9.8 5.5 9.5
Rather Satisfied 20.3 20.7 20.3
Fully Satisfied 35.7 41.4 36.0
Earnings
Fully Dissatisfied 13.7 10.7 13.5
Rather Dissatisfied 11.6 6.4 11.3
Neutral 10.6 8.3 10.5
Rather Satisfied 24.0 20.7 23.8
Fully Satisfied 25.7 33.9 26.1
Type of Work
Fully Dissatisfied 7.5 2.2 7.2
Rather Dissatisfied 8.1 5.5 8.0
Neutral 11.2 5.9 10.9
Rather Satisfied 29.1 27.5 29.0
Fully Satisfied 42.8 56.3 43.6
Number of Working Hours
Fully Dissatisfied 6.8 3.2 6.6
Rather Dissatisfied 8.5 5.6 8.3
Neutral 12.2 8.2 12.0
Rather Satisfied 28.2 24.1 28.0
Fully Satisfied 39.4 48.7 39.9
Work Schedule
Fully Dissatisfied 6.0 4.1 5.9
Rather Dissatisfied 7.6 3.0 7.3
Neutral 11.4 8.6 11.3
Rather Satisfied 27.6 22.9 27.3
Fully Satisfied 40.0 48.5 40.4
Working Conditions/Environment
Fully Dissatisfied 7.5 3.5 7.3
Rather Dissatisfied 8.5 5.4 8.4
Neutral 13.2 12.6 13.2
Rather Satisfied 30.1 23.8 29.8
Fully Satisfied 38.7 51.6 39.4
Distance to Job (Commuting)
Fully Dissatisfied 6.6 2.8 6.4
Rather Dissatisfied 7.4 4.8 7.3
Neutral 10.5 7.0 10.3
Rather Satisfied 25.9 21.8 25.7
Fully Satisfied 45.1 57.3 45.7
Matching Between Job and Qualifications
Fully Dissatisfied 10.0 5.0 9.7
Rather Dissatisfied 7.0 4.8 6.9
Neutral 9.3 6.9 9.2
Rather Satisfied 23.4 17.1 23.0
Fully Satisfied 44.6 56.8 45.2
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Table (6.2.2): OLS Regression Analysis for Level of Overall Job Satisfaction
Overall Level of Job Satisfaction
Religion 0.368***
(4.79)
Years of Schooling 0.0227***
(-4.21)
Work Experience 0.0325**
(2.94)
Square Experience 0.000760
(-1.93)
Male 0.263***
(-4.49)
0.00863
Greater Cairo (0.10)
-0.0124
Urban Lower (-0.16)
0.0349
Urban Upper (0.43)
-0.106
Rural Lower (-1.40)
-0.0593
Rural Upper (-0.74)
0.109**
Skill 1 (2.83)
0.223***
Skill 2 (5.14)
0.501***
Job Formality (9.07)
0.104*
Unionization (2.03)
-0.108*
Full Time (-2.09)
0.268***
Government Sector (3.96)
Father’s Education Yes
Mother’s Education Yes
Economic Activity Yes
N 5997
R2 0.134
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
67
Table (6.3.1): Discrimination at Different Gates of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Not in the 
Labor Force
Employment Unemployment Wage Employment Government Sector
Christian -0.00841 -0.0109 0.00715 -0.0942** -0.0743*
(-0.50) (-0.59) (0.49) (-3.28) (-2.18)
Male -0.552*** 0.575*** -0.0256*** 0.144*** -0.355***
(-91.78) (104.19) (-4.66) (9.28) (-20.27)
Years of Schooling -0.0110*** 0.00131 -0.000601 0.0127*** 0.0381***
(-12.62) (1.38) (-0.80) (8.69) (17.59)
Household Size -0.00339* 0.0109*** -0.0000947 -0.0156*** 0.00459
(-2.03) (5.45) (-0.06) (-5.33) (1.23)
Student -0.0755* 0.0411
(-2.43) (1.28)
Experience -0.00545*** 0.0144*** 0.00940*
(-4.70) (3.87) (2.29)
Experience Squared 0.000106* -0.000551*** 0.0000744
(2.42) (-4.10) (0.50)
Parents’ Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ Employment 
Status
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Father’s Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12063 12042 6000 5985 4428
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table (6.3.2): Discrimination at Different Employment Statuses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage Employment Employer Self Employment Unpaid Family and 
Subsistence Work
Christian -0.0942** 0.0394* 0.00168 0.0446*
(-3.28) (2.11) (0.10) (2.45)
Male 0.144*** 0.0830*** 0.0268* -0.141***
(9.28) (5.60) (2.02) (-21.46)
Years of Schooling 0.0127*** -0.000653 -0.00517*** -0.00406***
(8.69) (-0.62) (-5.01) (-5.79)
Experience 0.0144*** 0.00351 -0.00932*** -0.00355*
(3.87) (1.39) (-3.37) (-2.35)
Experience Squared -0.000551*** 0.0000297 0.000326*** 0.0000516
(-4.10) (0.36) (3.36) (0.96)
Household Size -0.0156*** -0.00136 -0.00183 0.0119***
(-5.33) (-0.80) (-0.80) (10.25)
Parental Background Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5985 5986 5986 5861
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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